How do you solve a problem like Korea?
China’s Seoul Solution to North Korean Nukes
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  • AnonymoussSoldier

    America doesn’t have a foreign policy of its own anyway. America is owned by billionaire internationalists and their MNCs. An America First aka nationalist policy would have never allowed billions per year to flow into a strategic competitor, like China, which helped to create and protect the Kim regime. An America First policy would tell MNCs to pis off and call out the CCP out for waging economic war on Seoul to pressure them over THAAD, and when it was the CCP that created the security dilemma in the first place!
    These MNCs are not SOEs being used to advance national objectives. They are merely private MNCs who love regimes standing against an America First policy, if one even briefly existed earlier this year. It doesn’t now.

    Trump appears to be much weaker than I anticipated. No matter what happens during his milk toast nationalist presidency, I fully expect to see a FOR REAL nationalist president and government in my lifetime. Could be much sooner than we think, too. A few more major terror attacks, another financial crisis and stock market wipe out coupled with open fraud and foreclosures. Another publicly funded bailout of the dolts on Wall Street who don’t know what they’re doing and who can’t manage money.

    • CheckYourself

      I’m excited for that day!

    • ltlee1

      Charles E Wilson’s famous quotes are “what was good for our country was good for General Motors and vice versa. The difference did not exist. Unfortunately, his day was long gone. Without the support of the large corporation, America First policy will have limited effectively.

      • AnonymoussSoldier

        Yeah you can’t have both. You either have giant MNCs outsourcing millions of jobs and hoarding profits, or you have SOEs which are used to advance national objectives. The money might still be handled in a very inequitable way, but at least SOEs are used to further a national agenda. That’s the case in china, and it works very, very, very well. Don’t believe me? Take a look at a picture of Beijing in the 80s and look at it today. That’s a blink of an eye really.

        If you want to get a clearer picture of just how powerful the driving force of greed is in MNCs then look at fortune 500 companies. You would be hard-pressed to find one of them that hasn’t had some intellectual property and/or trade secrets stolen by the Chinese in the last few years, perhaps year on year for decades. But they still grovel at the feet of the Communist Party trying to get in. That’s your capitalist multinational corporation. Mindless drones selling out people in one part of the world to use and abuse people another part to make major shareholders rich.

        Donald Trump talking all day about the stock market. Half of America is not even invested. Of the half that is, only a small percentage actually make their living off of it. Yes, I’ve got some stocks, but you know what would’ve been better for me when I was younger man? I would’ve traded having some stock for having a better job instead of it being outsourced when the factory in my hometown closed. You’re most powerful wealth building tool is your income. That is, unless you’re born into extraordinary wealth from day one, like Donald Trump.

        • ltlee1

          China had a big debate, the famous Salt-Iron Conference involving hundreds of government officials and scholars, over SOEs and private enterprises about 2000 years ago. The draw back of SOEs were then well known. For example, SOE produced salt was bitter and SOE produced iron was brittle. Yet Chinese governments over the millennia still resorted to SOEs as a mean to avoid taxing the people. So, the issue is not new but a matter of societal choice.

          Of course, MNCs also actively choose how to treat their trade secrets, namely, sell their secret for bigger corporate profits as well as CEO pay. The new twist at present is tax havens which allow MNC not to pay their share of taxes to the US government.

  • D4x

    Sean Keeley sounds just like the Kremlin: 12 12 2017 55°44′N 37°36′E Kremlin: We see Trump’s tweets as official statements Moskva when Keeley’s calumny opens with “[…]As North Korea launches missile after missile and President Trump tweets taunting threats to “Little Rocket Man,” the regular muscle-flexing, name-calling and button-pushing can be all too easy to tune out—ignored in the confident conviction that cooler heads will ultimately prevail, and that the cold logic of nuclear deterrence will prevent a rhetorical war from escalating into a hot one. […] except the Kremlin does NOT rely on secondary sources as Keeley does : CNN, NYT, WaPo, Guardian, Reuters, FT

    Most recent Dec. 12-13, 2017 PRIMARY SOURCES on America’s China Seoul, Rest of the World, Solution to North Korean Nukes:
    On “Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenges of 2017 and Beyond”
    Remarks Rex W. Tillerson Secretary of State
    The 2017 Atlantic Council-Korea Foundation Forum
    Washington, DC December 12, 2017
    U.S. Department of State:
    Press Statement Heather Nauert Department Spokesperson Washington, DC
    December 13, 2017 U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will participate in a UN Security Council Ministerial Briefing on
    Non-Proliferation and the DPRK on Friday, December 15, 2017 in New York, New York.
    Secretary Tillerson will reiterate that the United States and the international community will not stand by while North Korea continues to develop nuclear and missile capabilities that openly threaten international peace and security. The Secretary will continue
    to call on all member states to work together and maintain maximum pressure on the DPRK in order to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
    The Secretary will also meet with UN Secretary-General António Guterres
    Townhall [State Department EMPLOYEES] Rex W. Tillerson
    Secretary of State
    Steven (Steve) Goldstein
    Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Dean Acheson Auditorium Washington, DC
    December 12, 2017

    […] the very first week that I arrived, the White House requested that we put in place a policy to deal with North Korea’s
    nuclear weapons development program. I think many of you know that in the transition from the last administration to this one, President Obama highlighted this as probably one of the greatest threats to incoming President Trump, so he immediately put that up as the very first policy work for us to undertake.

    And we did develop the policy that was – has been in implementation ever since, which is to put in
    place the most comprehensive, broad-based, economic and diplomatic sanctions
    that I think North Korea has ever experienced. Significant participation
    internationally by countries around the world, and as time has gone by we have
    continuously increased that pressure. Our policy around North Korea is really
    simple and straightforward. It is to achieve a denuclearized – verifiable
    denuclearized Korean Peninsula. That’s a policy that’s shared by everyone,
    including the neighbors in the region. So we have a lot of common interest on
    which to build and that’s been the basis for the success of the sanctions. As
    you know, two very strong UN Security Council Resolutions, which garnered the
    support of both China and Russia – neighbors to North Korea – because they see the threat similar to the way we see it.

    So the effort is to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang knows that there’s a penalty to be paid for
    continuing this program, the development of this program, and that their
    isolation is only going to grow with time the more they continue to advance the
    program. All with an intention to have them come to the table and begin a
    discussion about the future of North Korea, and can we make a different choice
    about its future, one that doesn’t require nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons
    program for them to be secure and prosperous. But that campaign, I think, has
    achieved a level of pressure on North Korea that’s never been achieved by previous efforts.

    I know a lot of people make the observation that, well, this has been tried before and it didn’t work.
    We’ve never had this level of extreme sanctions. When fully executed, this is going to deny North Korea about $2.3 billion of their export revenue – complete ban on coal, textiles, export of forced labor; import limitations on fuel and
    oil; and then a very stringent enforcement of those sanctions, including individual sanctions, as well as sanctions on entities and banks who may be facilitating activities that are in violation of the sanctions themselves.

    Obviously, an important partner in this has been China, because China does account for and has been
    historically North Korea’s greatest ally. Very early on – in fact, my first overseas trip was to the region to visit Japan, South Korea, and then Beijing to talk about this policy and how we will – how we wanted to go about executingthat policy. China has been very cooperative – again, supportive at the UN Security Council. They are taking steps to enforce the sanctions.

    We believe that more can be done and we’re asking more be done, particularly with respect to supply of
    oil. We know that the sanctions are having an impact in North Korea on both the
    economy and the availability of a number of goods and certainly fuels to their
    economy. And so it is, again, our intention to maintain this particular pressure campaign and continue to turn that pressure up until we can get an engagement in a meaningful way with North Korea.

    Of course, in all diplomacy – and it’s not just unique to North Korea – as all of you know, an
    important part of our diplomatic success is that we have a strong military
    presence standing behind us, that if North Korea makes bad choices, that we’re
    prepared – militarily we’re prepared. Our military is always prepared and
    they’re prepared in this instance as well. That’s not the path we want to take,
    and certainly, at the State Department our role is to create an alternative
    pathway to address the threat, address the issue, and we’re going to continue to work in that regard.

    As a follow-on to the DPRK engagement, though, one of the – this really was the beginning of our
    China engagement. And in some respects, it was a good way to start this new
    administration’s relationship with China because it gave us something of a shared objective from the very beginning to pursue.

    And they were very open to hearing our approach and have been supportive in that regard.

    The China engagement then was really, I think, kicked off with the visit of President Xi to Mar-a-Lago,
    and many of you had important roles to play in making that presidential visit
    of President Xi with President Trump – that first engagement successful. As
    many of you know, we had many, many dialogues underway with China over the last
    many years. I think we had something like 26 separate dialogues. Most of them
    occurred at a – kind of a mid-level of contact with – between ministries. We
    wanted to elevate the dialogue and get closer to the decision-makers, so we
    needed to have dialogues that are closer to President Xi’s visibility and closer to President Trump.

    So we agreed with the Chinese that we would put four major dialogues in place and they would be led
    by very senior cabinet-level people from the United States and very senior
    Politburo and party people on the Chinese side who have direct access to
    President Xi. And that’s so that as we’re talking about issues, we don’t have a
    lot of circuitous pathways to get to decision-makers and get guidance back to
    inform our dialogues. So we created the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, which
    Secretary Mattis and I jointly lead with counterparts in China. We met twice this
    year. We talked about areas for cooperation, but we also identify areas where
    we have differences so we can begin to explore those differences. There is an
    economic and trade dialogue, there is a law enforcement and cyber security dialogue, and there is a social people-to-people dialogue.

    All four of these high-level dialogues met throughout the year and reported out the status of those discussions and President Trump’s recent state visit to Beijing.

    Our message to the Chinese in these dialogues was these need to be results-based dialogues, not
    just meet and talk. We have to produce something that moves this relationship
    forward. And what is this relationship? Well, the relationship with China has
    been pretty well defined since the opening of China with Nixon’s historic visit
    over the past many years with the “one China” policy, the commitment to the
    three communiques, and it did – it has led to a period of calm, prosperity as
    China’s economy has grown, and all of us have benefited globally with China’s
    economic growth. But now, a lot of things have kind of gotten out of balance, as you well know.

    And the dialogue we’re having with the Chinese today is, okay, that worked for the last 40 to 50 years, but China’s in a different place now today. Yes, you are in many respects still a developing nation because you have millions of people that are
    yet to move out of poverty and to middle class status, but you’re not the developing China of the Nixon era.

    You’re in a different place today and we’re in a different place, the United States.

    So what is the U.S.-China relationship going to be for the next 50 years and how do we define that
    relationship and how do we achieve China’s aspirational goal, which they have
    articulated to us is cooperation? They would like cooperation. They would like
    mutual respect. They would like a period – a continued period of no conflict
    and they would like win-win solutions. Those are great words. I like all those
    words. The question is: Can we achieve it in this relationship? And do those words mean the same thing to them that they mean to us?

    So these dialogues are serving very important purposes because behind all of these discussions is
    trying to understand what is going to define the U.S.-China relationship for the next half century. How are we going to live together, two great powers with great peoples that need to be – have needs that need to be served? So that’s
    framing much of the China policy in our engagement, and obviously, there are significant national security issues.

    We’re working together on North Korea on the one hand. We have very significant differences in the South
    China Sea on the other. China’s continued building of these structures in the
    South China Sea in territories that are disputed – others lay claim to – and
    then further militarizing those structures is a very serious issue that we talk
    about routinely. In our view, China has gone too far in this area. So can we
    achieve – at least today, can we achieve some kind of a halt? Can we freeze it
    where it is so we can sort out how we’re going to work through this? It’s a
    serious issue that is a concern to many of our allies and trading partners in
    the Southeast Asia region. So South China Sea is an area of difference that we’ve got to deal with.

    We have trade issues. As I said, we really enjoyed a lot of the economic growth of China over the many
    years, but things have gotten out of balance and there are big discrepancies in
    the trading relationship. How do we address those, and how do we address them
    in a way that supports U.S. interest, obviously, and American workers and our
    economic interest, but also in the context of recognizing this is a global
    issue? Because China is a global player in a global economy; we’re a global
    player. So where do we want to go sort these things out, and how do we want to
    work through that? And that’s what the trade and economic teams are working hard at doing.

    So with China it is not our intent to contain China’s economic growth. They must grow. They still have
    hundreds of millions of people that need to move out of poverty. But we do pay
    close attention to their One Belt, One Road policy, which articulates their
    view of their future of how they’re going to grow their economy, and how
    they’re going to protect that economic growth, and perhaps extend some of their
    own spheres of influence around the world. And how does that impact on our
    economic growth and our national security interest? As China promotes its One
    Belt, One Road, I like to use the quote from Secretary Mattis: China has One
    Belt, One Road; the United States and the global economy has many belts and
    many roads, and no one country gets to choose the belt or the road. It’s part
    of the global order, the international system of rules and norms. And China can
    choose to carry out its One Belt, One Road within that system, or it can try to
    redefine that. And that’s what a lot of the discussion between us is about: How
    are we going to live together? How are both of us going to be prosperous together?

    A lot of work on China.
    And again, I want to thank Susan Thornton. Susan was the first acting assistant
    secretary I met and worked with, because it was DPRK week one. And I appreciate
    her leadership of that bureau and all of the hard work of her team over the
    year. They’ve had a plateful to work on. They’ve done a great job supporting
    our policy development, and importantly, our execution of the policy. […]
    [DEFEAT ISIS, Syria, Iraq, elsewhere; new South Asia strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; Russia,Ukraine; Iran;

    Detailed State of the State Department Redesign; Q&A]

    UNDER SECRETARY GOLDSTEIN: Thank you very much. I’m Steve Goldstein. I’m the new under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs, and it’s a great honor to be here today. (Applause.) We asked for questions around the world, and why don’t
    we start with the first one we received: “Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with the progress that we’ve made on DPRK’s nuclear program?”

    SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, actually, I am. I’m quite satisfied. And this kind of gets back to people’s expectations of how quickly daunting challenges like this can actually be solved. But if you think about where we started with this effort – and it
    really was articulated back in March – we had our first engagements with our
    two most important trilateral allies, Japan and South Korea, and then with the
    leadership in Beijing to articulate to them, here’s our policy. Here’s what we intend to do. Can we cooperate on this?
    Can you support this? Is it in your interest? And we expressed our view to them as to why it should be in their interest, and they,
    I think, agreed, and certainly have indicated so.

    And then it takes some time to build this international understanding. And so through a lot of hard
    diplomacy, again, by many of you and many people at post, because we put out
    messages that we ask ambassadors and charges around the world to deliver to the
    host governments there, and then through a lot of hard work at the UN to
    achieve these two very important, very stringent resolutions around sanctions
    in response to these ongoing provocations from North Korea – it takes time to
    build that. We – I think we are really – we sense and we see we’re kind of
    reaching the zenith of all of that effort. We have had countries around the world step forward and take actions they didn’t have to, but because we engaged with them, explained to them why this was in their interest.

    And we’ve had little countries that might not have a lot of economic activity with North Korea, but what did they do?
    They sent their diplomats home. Peru sent the North Korean ambassador home – Peru. You can say ah, what’s the big deal in that?
    Well, I can tell you, when 20 – I think we now have 23 countries that have done that,
    and the regime in North Korea notices that their Peruvian ambassador is not in Peru anymore, he’s back here. And that sends them a message: You’re becoming disconnected from the world. And that’s part of asking every country who agrees
    with this threat and wants to do something – we’re going to give you an opportunity to do something to support it.

    And I think the recognition internationally broadly and the actions that have been taken as a
    result have put us in a place that we’ve never been before in terms of a unified international message to North Korea: We do not accept your nuclear weapons program. We want you to make a different choice. And when you can
    amplify that message through as many countries as we’ve been able to amplify
    it, and then begin to actually put in place actions that are denying them
    significant revenue streams, that’s to get their attention, to say you’re really alone on this one and let’s talk about this.

    So I’m satisfied with where we’ve been able to move this pressure – I call it the peaceful pressure
    campaign – to this stage. Is it going to produce the result we want? We can
    only do our part of this, and the regime in Pyongyang is going to have to come
    to some decision about their future. We want them to make the right choice,
    which is to stop. Let’s sit down and talk about it. Because if they keep going,
    they can cross a point at which there’s nothing left for us in the diplomatic
    community to do – we’ve done everything we can do – and we don’t want to get to
    that point. And I’ve said to my partner, Secretary Mattis, many times, if we get there, I’ve failed. I’ve failed. And I don’t want to fail.

    So we’re going to keep it up. We’re going to keep working with partners. And again, we have great support around the world on this issue. So I am satisfied with what our team has been able to put in place to this point, but we have no victory in hand.

    […Q&A from employees]

  • Europa

    North Korea is a product of China whose main purpose is her nuclear arsenal. Her economy should be advanced and not in such a bad shape where the people are starving. Sandwiched between two successful economies in a region of stellar economies, North Korea is oddly backward.
    China has been able to project her nuclear power into South Asia through Pakistan and East Asia through North Korea. the problem of North Korea goes back to the Korean war and for letting North Korea develop her nuclear technology which she procured from Pakistan through Pakistan’s nuclear father Dr. Khan.

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