With the Middle East on fire and China challenging America’s dominant position in the Pacific, arguing that America should refocus on strategic engagement with Europe isn’t an easy sell. But this is precisely what is needed. Europe is fast becoming a problem continent yet again, and the implications of this transformation challenge the core assumptions of Transatlantic security. Far from being “done”, as was the mantra in Washington in the heady post-Cold War days, there is pressure building in and around Europe over national politics, EU governance, economics, immigration, terrorism, radicalism, and state-on-state conflict.
All of these issues are squeezing the Continent from three directions at once. First, there is escalating pressure against Europe’s southern flank, as ISIL pushes across the Middle East; jihadi recruitment and activity are spreading deeper into Europe and new refugees land on its shores every day. Even more troubling is the resurgence of an authoritarian, re-arming, and geostrategically assertive Russia, which has once again brought state-on-state conflict, as well as the threat of more to come, to Europe’s northeastern periphery; in fact, Putin’s irredentism, coupled with Europe’s progressive disarmament, has already exposed the brittleness of allied consensus on collective defense. The third factor that continues to undermine Europe’s security is the ongoing euro crisis. The constant wrangling over the future of a now-bankrupt Greece is merely the most visible symbol of deeper issues confronting the European Union project. Today there is no consensus on how the crisis will ultimately play itself out, but what is clear is that the outcome will be painful, not just for Greece but for the entire community.
Yet Washington still remains wedded to the conventional depiction of an overly bureaucratic Europe that nonetheless somehow manages to plod along. There has not been enough appreciation in the United States of the depth of internal discord that is now a reality among European publics, nor of the Continent’s inability to address its fundamental hard security requirements. There needs to be a greater appreciation of the polarization between Europe’s northeastern states and its inner core over the scope of Russia’s threat to Europe and how to deal with it. The former Soviet colonies and the old Western Europe differ significantly on what needs to be done to reinforce their common defense.
The deepening discord and public dissatisfaction over the European Commission’s plans to reallocate immigrants to every country is one example of the larger public discontent with how EU institutions work—and this discontent will likely deepen unless the European Parliament begins to reflect the genuine popular will. Last but not least, though the euro project continues to hobble along, few in Europe today would venture to predict the long-term political and economic costs of the undertaking. In the face of the Greek debacle, some have called for a “two-speed Europe” which is the very antithesis of what the common currency once symbolized.
The deteriorating situation in and around Europe requires renewed engagement from the United States. Transatlanticism remains vital to our mutual security and to the preservation of the U.S.-led open international order. Today, as pressure builds in and around Europe, the U.S. needs to looks for ways to work with a Continent that is turning further inward, as Europe’s leaders and its publics struggle to adapt their institutions to the new environment. Hence, the current and future U.S. administrations need to recognize how disruptive the crosscurrents now facing Europe are going to be in the years to come, and to respond with vigor to reaffirm the strategic importance of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. For too long now, U.S. policy toward Europe has rested on the reasonable, if ultimately unworkable, assumption that wealthy Europeans should handle their affairs close to home and rise to the occasion when problems emerge out of area. Regrettably, this has not been the case. We are both worse off for it.
Public and private admonitions and cajoling by the U.S. won’t work unless they’re backed up by a clearly articulated vision of the U.S. relationship with Europe in the next decade, of the common objectives we want to achieve, and, most of all, of the belief that common defense remains the unbreakable bond between the United States and Europe. Public diplomacy will not substitute for deeper U.S. strategic engagement with Europe. Without it, we will continue to measure our relationship with Europe in marginal increments, treating every 0.2 percent increase in defense spending as news worth celebrating.
