Perhaps the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leaders knew in advance the magnitude of the impending setback, but for all others the June 7 election results were surely dramatic. Not only did the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP) manage to cross the 10 percent threshold necessary to enter parliament for the first time on its own steam, but also the AKP, which has had a total lock on Turkish politics since 2002, lost its parliamentary majority, though it remains the largest political formation.

It was a defeat for both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, with wide-ranging consequences domestically and internationally. The election was fought over one issue: Erdogan’s desire to alter the constitution to transform Turkey from a parliamentary system into a presidential one. He had assumed the non-executive, theoretically non-partisan, but quite powerful presidency after three terms as Prime Minister, during which Turkey emerged as an important regional if not global actor. Improving living standards and a burgeoning economy made Erdogan the uncontested leader. But as he and his party lurched from one success to another, hubris also set in. Corruption scandals, increasing authoritarianism, Islamicization, and a sense of disdain for large segments of the population also galvanized a disparate yet increasingly powerful opposition.

Erdogan became omnipresent thanks to his control of both the state and private media, large chunks of which are owned by his cronies. His relentless drive to alter the constitutional system, along with his take-no-prisoners attitude, backfired on him. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, admittedly not as charismatic as Erdogan but, as the leader of the party, in charge of running the election campaign, couldn’t escape from under the President’s long shadow. When it became clear that AKP’s prospects were dimming, Erdogan decided to further immerse himself into the campaign, elbowing his successor out, further diminishing the AKP’s brand, and, in the process, making the contest all about himself. These moves only served to alienate ordinary voters. Turkey, after all, has been going to the polls since 1950. The circumstances haven’t always been ideal, but they have at least taught voters that a President ought not to campaign for the party, and certainly he should not attack other parties in Erdogan’s unbecoming and partisan way.

The effect of Erdogan’s take-no-prisoners campaign was not only to personalize the election but also to polarize the electorate; if you were not for him, then you were a traitor, a tool of foreign interests. Americans and Europeans—not to mention Jews—were all in league to overthrow him. The debasement of the discourse and its anti-American tone is something of which the U.S. administration will have to take note. It is rare for the leader of a NATO country to so thoroughly denigrate its primary friend in the alliance.

The other surprising factor in this election was the easy success of the HDP. In Turkey’s complicated electoral system, Erdogan’s only hope for obtaining the 330 seats necessary to call for a constitutional referendum was for the HDP to fail to cross the national 10 percent threshold. (In all the areas where HDP is strongest, AKP is the runner up. Hence, if the HDP had not made it past 10 percent, its seats would have gone straight to the AKP.) With polls showing that the HDP was on the cusp, many citizens decided to cast a strategic vote—that is, to vote for HDP instead of their normal choice, just to ensure its success. This surge and a brilliant campaign run by the HDP and its charismatic leader, Selahattin Demirtas, were enough to propel it past 13 percent, crossing the threshold with room to spare.

It is still too early to discount the AKP. As its 40-plus percent vote share demonstrates, it is not about to disappear. However, it will need to change and to emerge from Erdogan’s authoritarian shadow. Consciously or not, Erdogan gambled in this election, because this was his only chance to institutionalize his conservative vision. Paradoxically, it is Erdogan and the AKP’s success in the past 12 years that has laid the foundations for change. Erdogan emancipated the pious Turks who had long felt oppressed by the secular government, and under his tutelage a prosperous middle class has emerged, a segment of which remains attached to him. But these changes also helped bring to Turkey a young and dynamic population that is increasingly connected to the rest of the world, thanks, among other things, to social media and technology. More tourists than ever now visit Turkey; Turks travel abroad in greater numbers. Middle class and aspiring Turks are uncomfortable with the AKP and Erdogan’s growing religiosity—famously symbolized by Erdogan’s brandishing of the Quran during an election rally, which is a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the country’s rules. These voters seek more freedom, not less.

In the medium term, Turkey will be consumed by coalition-formation negotiations. Erdogan is akin to a wounded tiger; he is unlikely to accept these results as final. His ideas for a presidential system may be dead for the time being, but that hasn’t stopped his mouthpiece media outlets from arguing that the absence of a majoritarian government is all the proof one needs of the importance of a presidential system for stability. Erdogan is a formidable politician with many aces up his sleeve. Count him out at your own peril.