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Crisis in Ukraine
Finlandization Is Not a Solution for Ukraine

The term “Finlandization” is making a comeback as a proposed remedy for Ukraine’s delicate position between East and West. A look back at Finland’s postwar experience shows us why this is a bad idea.

Published on: July 27, 2014
James Kirchick is a fellow with the Foreign Policy Initiative and a correspondent for The Daily Beast.
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  • Thirdsyphon

    Our “foreign policy mandarins” might also wish to bear in mind, as they undertake the author’s prescribed course of study, that Finland was an ally of the Axis during World War II,and an enthusiastic participant in Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union. This small detail (which somehow escaped notice in an article that missed little else) might be worth considering if one is revisiting the “moral case” for Finlandization.

    • El Gringo

      This is a gross oversimplification of history.

      • Thirdsyphon

        Not true. A gross oversimplification would have been to refer to Finland as a member of the Axis, or as an “Axis Power,” which she was not. The subtle moral and legal distinction between entering the war as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact (i.e.: as a full-fledged member of the Axis) and entering the war as a signatory to the Anti-Comintern Pacts of 1936 and 1941 (i.e.: as a co-belligerent aligned with Germany and the other Axis powers with the ostensible goal of fighting Communism) was understandably lost on the victorious Allies, to whom Finland’s reasons for siding with Germany were much less signifcant than the fact that she did.Still, it’s a distinction that Finland managed to maintain in the face of what must have been overwhelming diplomatic pressure from their allies, and it carries at least some small measure of moral significance.
        The bottom line, though, is pretty hard to oversimplify: Finland fought for the Axis in World War II. The morality of the treatment that the Allies subsequently meted out to her (“Finlandization”, as opposed to full independence [on the one hand] or outright absorption into the USSR [on the other]) should therefore be viewed -and judged- as the fate of a defeated enemy nation.

        • Andrew Allison

          Agreed, but to return to the subject of the post [/grin], Ukraine is in the same position as was Finland in that there’s nobody willing to go to the mat to protect her from the Bear, and she needs to make the best of a bad job. Unhappily for Ukraine, there’s little indication that the government recognizes this.

          • Thirdsyphon

            The Europeans are (finally) stepping up to the plate and imposing meaningful sanctions; but if Kiev has been laboring under the impression that NATO’s sternly worded press releases and dispensations of nonlethal aid are a sign that NATO plans to mobilize its forces to defend Ukraine against a Russian attack. . .then Putin’s crude slanders about that regime’s alleged stupidity and incompetence will turn out to have been understated.
            Unlike Georgia, whose leaders we actually did egg on with quasi-assurances of support that we had no intention of backing up, nothing that has ever been said in public to the government in Kiev could be reasonably (or even unreasonably) read as a NATO guarantee of Ukraine’s security.
            On the other hand, Ukraine might still have one useful ally it can count on: the people of Ukraine. Like Finland, Ukraine has a proven track record of standing up to the Sov- er, Russians to great effect. In the aftermath of World War II, Ukrainian nationalists waged a bitter guerilla war -for years on end- against the combat-hardened troops of the Soviet Union, whose leader at the time was Josef Stalin. With help from absolutely nobody, the Ukrainian guerillas killed somewhere in the neighborhood of 50,000 Soviet troops (the Red Army suffered more than 20,000 casualties in the first six months of fighting; after that, they stopped reporting figures, but the insurgency went on for two more years).

          • Andrew Allison

            “nothing that has ever been said in public to the government in Kiev could be reasonably (or even unreasonably) read as a NATO guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”
            Budapest Memorandum? Or perhaps you meant to write “to the current government”. It must also be said that calling the Ukraine government stupid and incompetent is not slanderous, but the simple truth.

          • Thirdsyphon

            The Budapest Memorandum was a security guarantee of sorts, in the sense that it creates a valid casus beli for the Western signatories (the U.S. and Britain) to intervene militarily if they see fit, but it stops well short of imposing a binding obligation on them to do so. Also, as a practical matter, the Budapest Memorandum was executed by the U.S. in its capacity as an individual nation, and not on behalf of NATO; our treaty allies would not be bound to assist us. Any decision to intervene under the Memorandum would be taken unilateraly (or at best in concert with Britain), and at our own risk. . . a risk we’d be crazy to run for the sake of Ukraine.
            Still, as clear as these facts are in Washington, it’s possible that they might be less clear in Kiev. . . especially if their leaders are panicked enough to be grasping at straws and indulging in magical thinking. So you’re right- there’s at least one document that can be unreasonably read by Kiev as a guarantee of American protection.

    • R K

      That is twisting the facts. Finland was under invasion from the Soviet Union and accepted aid from the only country willing to give it, Germany. Finland’s only other option would have been to do nothing and let Stalin commit genocide on her people. Finland was one of the very few countries that played a part in World War 2 with little to nothing to repent for.

      I would also like to point out that Finland was never a part of the Axis, nor was it “an enthusiastic participant in Hitler’s attac on the Soviet Union”. Either you have some external agenda here or you’re just not educated enough to speak of this subject. Finland fought to preserve its own existence, that is not a crime.

      • Thirdsyphon

        I have no axe to grind with FInland, I assure you; and I’m aware that the Soviet Union invaded Finland in the winter of 1939, thereby precipitating the conflict that the Finnish govenment claimed (and perhaps even believed) that their participation in the 1941 German invasion of Russia was merely a “continuation” of. What makes that claim problematic, of course, is the existence of the Moscow Peace Treaty, which brought an official end to the “Winter War” in March of 1940. At the time Finland invaded the Soviet Union, the two countries were at peace. Nor was it particularly likely that Stalin would have chosen to invade them again, at least in the short term. Soviet losses in the Winter War had been surprisingly high, and the Red Army by then had a host of more pressing concerns.

        “Enthusiastic” is a subjective term, I’ll grant you, but data points like President Ryti’s hubristic proclamations about a racially cohesive “Greater Finland” and C-in-C. Mannerheim’s exuberant (and apparently spontaneous) “Sword Scabbard Declaration” wherein he pledged to liberate Karelia and lands adjacent from “Lenin’s scoundrels and their wretched henchmen. . . [who bear] the Mark of Cain on their foreheads” suggest to me that Finland’s participation in the conflict was more than pro forma.

        I’m well aware that Finland never signed the Tripartite Pact and was therefore technically never a member of the Axis. However, as I’m sure you’re aware, Finland’s execution of the Anti-Comintern Pact, both in its original form and as amended in 1941, bound them into a military alliance with all of the Axis Powers, and not just Germany. So while you’re correct to emphasize that Finland was not a member of the Axis, it is entirely accurate and fair to say that Finland was a treaty ally of the Axis Powers, both in law and in fact.

        Becoming a willing ally of Hitler’s Germany qualifies handily in my book as “something to repent for”; giving material aid and support to German forces en route to establish the Siege of Leningrad is likewise “something to repent for”. . . but in rejecting your claim that FInland is uniquely blameless it is in no way my intention to imply that I believe that anyone else, including the Western Allies, emerged from that war free of sin.

  • BobSykes

    The issue here is not what is good for Ukraine in some utopian world. The real issue here is peace in Europe. At present, each side is engaging in a tit-for-tat escalation that eventually will lead to a pan-European war, which will quickly go nuclear.

    Ukraine was an integral part of Russia for over 300 years. It was part of Russia before the union of Scotland and England, before there was a Germany, Italy, British Empire, USA, before any country in Central and South America was independent, and before many countries in central Europe existed as independent states. Many Russians claim the source of their country is Viking Kiev of 1,000 years ago. There are deep cultural and economic connections between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine is not a normal country. Its current independence is an accident of history.

    Finlandization is, in fact, the correct solution to this problem. Clearly, it cannot be part of NATO. That is a casus belli of the first order. Some sort of association with the EU short of full membership is likely acceptable to Russia. It was not too long ago that some people were suggesting both EU and NATO membership for Russia.

    Unfortunately, the US/EU/NATO leaders believe that the alliance’s military and economic power are so overwhelming that they can simply impose anything on anyone with utter impunity.

    • El Gringo

      Aquitaine was part of England for over 300 years. Most of Central and South America was part of Spain for well over 300 years. The “Ukraine is an integral part of Russia” argument is a wooly old sheep that poorly attempts to veil Russian imperialism in some kind of historical apology. Do the housemothers of Moscow have a personal “interest” in keeping Ukraine subservient? No. What is it to them? Ukraine may be a basket case but that’s no excuse to throw it under the Russian bus.

    • Rosty

      Funny how easily armchair strategists dismiss what people themselves want. Ukrainians wanted with their lives for freedom from those precious russian values: corruption and disregard for individual. Dream as much as you want, but see for yourself whether Ukrainians will accept your patronizing advice to surrender.

    • Government Drone

      Kaliningrad/East Prussia was a recognized part of Germany for well over 300 years before 1945; by this reasoning Russia has to give it up. Unless you want to revive “right of conquest” as a legitimate basis for territorial claims.

    • pdexter

      Finland was part of Russia for 100 years and part of Sweden for much over 500 years.

      You have some kind of weird image that Russia has “right” to Ukraine.

    • rw

      What you are suggesting is tantamount to surrender. Who can forget those famous words of Petro Poroshenko:” We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields, and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills. We shall never surrender!”

  • Pete

    “Finlandization Is Not a Solution for Ukraine”

    It is either that or absorption into Russia as it is not in America’s national interest to sacrifice blood and treasure to see that the Ukraine be a truly functional state.

    Let Russia have it. The Ukraine is better thought of as not the bread basket of Russia but a basket case.

    • Breif2

      (Preface: I shall use the commonly accepted meaning of Finlandization as “adopting a neutral foreign policy in exchange for keeping one’s independence”.)

      We could decide that we are not willing to back Ukraine in any material way and inform the Ukrainian government that it is on its own. They can make their choice between fighting or folding, but we’re not getting involved. I choose not to debate the merits of this policy.


      Pushing the Ukrainian government to accept Finlandization if we have no intention of backing them up if/when Russia starts violating their independence is repugnant.

  • Duperray

    What else than neutral foreign policy can a small country having a common border with a giant? Neutrality provides peace and Finland has not been invaded for 73 years, nor Switzerland for many centuries !
    By the way what is the value of “independent foreign policy?” Foreign policy is a game of politicians who believe they rule the universe, look to past 5 centuries foreign policies in Europe: War after war, destruction after destruction, then for which result? Just defining borders as per geographical natural barriers !….. What a slaugther.
    Back in America: Do you really believe James that both Canada and Mexico have each an independent foreign policy?
    The only one in this region is Cuba, constrained to apparent neutrality under the pressure of an immediate US invasion since 1962.
    All small countries in contact with a giant are obliged (or happy) to have neutral policies because in one way or another, the giant must protect them, not by generosity or perversed “human rights”, but for the sake of the giant’s security itself.
    US are throwing oil of the ukrainian fire they have inadvertedly caused (as usual). Their present short minded foreign policy and outstanding arrogance is even not to their benefit: World is slowly emerging from massive US media campaign and one by one discover that west ukrainian army is used in full force against civilian population instead of a simple police operation. When the malaise is more general, Russia migh be obliged to invade East Ukraine (alike US for Kosovo, without UN mandate), throw away nazi Kiev regime, call UN troops to separate fighters, initiate elections and so on.
    Not a single US person will ever be accepted in the East from now on. Congratulation Obama Kerry team, as blind as per their hyper amaggeddonized climatic campaign….. It is a pity to watch such a great nation, powerful, advanced, with unparalled armies, lead by ignorant arrogant sectarian “so called leaders” who are in fact controlled by some obscure sects (green and else).

  • Gene

    As most of the comments here demonstrate, we have now fully entered the era of the washing of hands. Boil down all policy options to stark choices of appeasement vs. bloody war, declare one’s opposition to the latter and voila! Solution found, matter settled.

  • PKCasimir

    Finlandization is a synonym for appeasement.

    • Andrew Allison

      Finlandization is making the best of a bad situation. The alternative for Finland was absorbtion into the USSR.

      • PKCasimir

        In your opinion, but then again, you don’t have to live under the subsequent oppression. How noble of you to dismiss other people’s fundamental rights.

        • Andrew Allison

          What part of “In exchange for not joining NATO and other Western institutions such as the European Economic Community (forebear to the European Union), Finland enjoyed a degree of freedom unknown to the Soviet republics or communist satellite states.” is unclear to you? New Russia will not accept a Western embrace of Ukraine anymore than the USSR would have tolerated one of Finland.

    • ShadrachSmith

      I have been married 45 years, and there is much to be said for appeasement. I call Finlandization, bowing to the east without mooning the west. It is an excellent policy for continuing to exist.

      • Andrew Allison

        Yes Dear!

  • Andrew Allison

    ” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, long ago prophesied to go “out of area or out of business”, has found new purpose deterring an old adversary.” Surely you jest? NATO has shown itself to be impotent in the face of Russian revanchism.

    • Thirdsyphon

      The Finns didn’t have an alternative because the West didn’t choose to give them one. Stopping the Soviet Union from physically occupying their territory (conditioned upon the Finns behaving themselves and staying neutral) was a pretty big favor, given the circumstances; and it pretty much exhausted the Western Allies’ (none too generous) store of good will towards their former enemy.
      In moral terms, a case could be made that the Finns got pretty much what they deserved. They fought alongside the Axis, but they didn’t actually join the Axis; and their attack on Russia, unlike Hitler’s, was motivated by a desire (albeit an opportunistic one) to rectify and avenge a legitimate grievance (the unprovoked Soviet invasion two years before). True, they allied themselves with a monster. . . but then, who didn’t? Let he who was never photographed drinking with Stalin cast the first stone. (Heck, even Stalin thought he’d made a deal with the devil. . . A globe-spanning colonial empire [ruled by a King, no less] and a country that most Marxists believed was the final apotheosis of Capitalism that their dialectical-materialist prophecies foretold were deeply problematic and bizarre allies for a Worker’s Paradise to have). So it was probably hard for the Western Allies to judge them too harshly for that; but still, the fact remained that they had taken sides against the Allies, and such behavior could set a bad example if it was allowed to go unpunished. From that perspective, Finlandization struck many Western observers as their just desserts. They wouldn’t be occupied or conquered, or compelled to change their form of government- but they would be left in the company of a large, irritable, immensely powerful former enemy that they would have to be very, very, very, very nice to. . . pretty much forever.
      In practical terms, Finlandization made even more sense. The Soviet Union would have never accepted a militarized, NATO-aligned Finland on its border, because of the security threat that a Finnish army (let alone a NATO-backed FInnish army) would pose to Leningrad. For evidence, See Exhibit A: Finland’s recent invasion of Russia and close approach to Leningrad. Also, even if the USSR were to somehow sign off on the concept of tolerating the presence of a NATO ally on the border of Russia itself, Finland is not well-placed, strategically, for NATO to assist in its defense. (It’s spectacularly placed, however, to join in a NATO attack, as history proves. . . which is what Stalin would naturally have assumed the NATO allies would have in mind in seeking Finland’s admission to NATO).
      Anyway, the bottom line is that the Finns probably couldn’t have done much better during the Cold War than they actually did; and considering how many utterly innocent nations were left to groan beneath Soviet chains because they happened to be physically located between Moscow and Berlin, Finland should thank her lucky stars.

      • Andrew Allison

        Thank you for taking the time to explain in detail just why it was that Finland was between a rock and a hard place, and chose the lesser of two evils. The same, of course, is true for Ukraine: the West will not go to war for it (or based on current form do very much else). The alternatives to the Finlandization of Ukraine are stark: partition or an endless civil war. Brutal, but that’s the way it is. History will not treat kindly the responsibility of the EU for this debacle.

        • Thirdsyphon

          The West is in no mood at the moment to wage open war against anybody, anywhere, for any purpose; but that doesn’t matter. The streets of every Western capital could be packed, day after day, with millions of furious citizens, waving Ukranian flags as they chant in booming unison for Vladimir’s head on a pike; the editorial pages of every news outlet from The Economist to Weekly World News could be aflame with impassioned jeremiads calling for war; every poll could consistently show 99% support for war with Russia (plus or minus a 2% margin of error). . . and this particular war still would not be waged.

          There are no casual wars against Russia. A decision by NATO to directly engage their forces, even if those forces were cloaked in maskirovka and unconvincingly pretending to be “Ukranian separatists”, and even if the operation was just a small scale tactical one-off, would have far-reaching and unpredictable strategic consequences. Vladimir Putin is an aggressive and intemperate leader whose political strength is derived from the popular perception of him as a strong leader. He can’t afford to look weak- the moment that he does is the beginning of the end.(**) If we were to confront and embarrass him that bluntly, he’d have to respond. . . and his response would probably be to roll tanks, proclaim the Republic of Eastern Ukraine, and take up strategic positions along the new border before NATO has a chance to block him.

          NATO could respond by staging a real life historical reenactment of the Kursk Salient; or it could take a slightly craftier tack and blockade the Crimean Peninsula (using whatever modern tactic serves the function of a naval blockade without the need to actually line up surface vessels like ducks in a shooting gallery). The strategic goal would be modest: to interdict civilian shipping only, thereby making life miserable for civilians on the Crimean Peninsula and crashing their local economy, perhaps inspiring some of them to press their government to sue for peace or even -eventually- depart in search of greener pastures in Mother Russia. If economic conditions get bad enough, Putin might eventually be forced to choose between either revoking the Russian passports he so impulsively bestowed on all the residents (thereby potentially igniting a pro-Ukranian political movement in Crimea) or allowing the peninsula to slowly empty out like a gigantic Detroit. Sound a bit too ruthless? A bit too dangerous? You’re probably right- but that’s the game we’ll be playing, if we tangle with the Bear. Russia can no longer claim to be a Superpower without flunking the laugh test, but it probably remains a bona fide Great Power. It’s been a very, very long time since America last squared off against an enemy in that weight class, and in that time I think we may have forgotten some of the ground rules. The most important such rule (forgotten by our friends and foes alike) is to never confront a Great Power without a Great Reason. But I digress.
          Anyway, if our true concern is the welfare of the people of Eastern Ukraine, we should bear in mind that any escalation of the ongoing conflict, however carefully measured, and now matter how tightly it’s controlled(*) risks inflicting great damage on the very people we’re trying to help. If you think the current punch-and-judy version of the insurgency is destructive, just wait until the professionals get involved.

          A much safer (and smarter, and in the long run more effective) route would be for Europe to take the diplomatic lead for once and impose some meaningful economic sanctions against Russia. Germany might wish to reconsider the wisdom of decommissioning all of its nuclear power plants; France might consider building some new ones, to generate power for export. Russia is not a wealthy country, and energy is just about the only product suitable for export that their economy can competitively produce. The prosperity of Europe would take a hit, but Russia would go into a tailspin.

      • ML

        When Finland surrendered to the USSR in 1944, it gave up territory (including its only Arctic port) and paid massive reparations to the victor nation. I don’t know if we can label voluntary decisions of Finnish and Soviet leaders over the next 40-50 years, as additional “terms” of this surrender.

        By a similar logic, one could claim that if a state in the American South differs with the Federal government on a given issue today, this is part of the policy imposed on the Southern States after they lost the Civil War 150 years ago.

        “left in the company of [the USSR]” doesn’t seem like quite the right way of putting it, since Finland would have been in the company of its eastern neighbor regardless of what side it had chosen to fight on during the war. “Finlandization” seems less like a consequence of Finland’s wartime actions than of its geographical location (and of how Finnish/Soviet leaders chose to react to this fact). West Germany doesn’t share a border with the USSR, and it was never “Finlandized” despite having inflicted far more losses on the USSR than Finland ever did.

        • Thirdsyphon

          True, the Soviets seized the opportunity to re-take everything that they had originally stolen from Finland in the WInter War, only this time under color of international law. They also prevailed upon Finland to lease (not give) them the strategically significant Porkkala Peninsula for a term of 50 years, and demanded steep reparations on top of it. And for all their consummate rapacity, the USSR could have done (and, to just about everyone else, they did do) far, far worse, The Soviets were tyrranical and cruel; they were terrible victors; vae victis. Of course, the unfairness of all this would have cried to the heavens more loudly had Finland, in its own turn as the apparent victor of the Continuation War, had been content to claim only land that was rightfully Finland’s. Instead, her leaders chose to embrace a preposterous Fascist fever dream: a sort of “Arctic Anschluss” that would be known (however briefly) as “Greater Finland.” But, you know. . at the time the Finns were saying that stuff, they had every right to, in the sense that nobody else was in a position to contradict them. [insert Greek translation of vae victis].
          It’s hard to know, in the context of Finland’s no doubt deeply felt bonds of “Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” with the Soviet Union, how many of Finland’s decisions were truly voluntarily (or truly Finland’s). As for the American South, the fact that states like Alabama and Mississippi might have wished to chart a different course for themselves on isues like, for example, civil rights, their difference of opinion with the Federal Government on these topics was obviously not the result of their defeat in the Civil War; the fact that their difference of opinion is completely irrelevant, on the other hand, is a direct result of the terms that were imposed on them as a consequence of their defeat in the Civil War.
          Moving on: you’re correct. “Left in the company of the USSR” wasn’t the right way to put it. Finland’s adjacency to Russia was a fact beyond even the Allies’ willingness to negotiate. What I should have said was that Finland’s punishment was to be “left alone in the company of the USSR.”
          . .

  • moderate Guy

    The only people who accepted the canard that NATO could be “out of area or out of business” are the idiots who perpetuated the lie that Soviet Union was anything other than a Russian empire under a different guise.

  • @IlmarMetsalo

    This rather excellent article misses one key point: Finlandization was possible because of Sweden. If the Soviet Union had tried to limit Finland’s freedom over a certain limit (ie. making it a people’s republic) Sweden would have joined NATO in no time. Two “neutral” countries in the Baltic Sea region resulted a balance that allowed Finland’s unique position as a Western democracy Soviet sphere of influence.

    Ukraine does not have Sweden.

    • Andrew Allison

      The article is, IMHO and that of most other commentators, nonsensical. But you raise an interesting point about Sweden. On the whole, I’m inclined to think that the risk of Sweden joining NATO did not play any part, but it’s worth thinking about.

      • rw

        Kirchick mentioned a very important point: For the Kremlin’s appetite will not be satisfied by a Finlandized Ukraine; it will next demand similar arrangements for all the countries in its “near abroad.” This is just the beginning to a very serious problem. Unless and until the West takes a seriously strong stand against Putin’s undeclared war against Kiev and commits to keeping Ukraine united and independent, Putin will continue on his present path of stealth conquest. He will implement his own vision of Novorossiya as a step towards re-establishing a “Greater Russia” – one that continues its aggressive expansionism well beyond Ukraine and in which he plays a major role on the world stage dedicated to undercutting the West and its democratic values.

    • mladenm

      Soviet Union was happy to have buffer zone in North and it significantly cut front line in possible war. Finland avoided massive American troop deployment, too. Would you like US armoured division near Porvoo?

      • londonscandie

        Yes, quite a few of us would be very happy to have one there — and would have been even more pleased if the US had been there during the Cold War.

        • mladenm

          I’d recommend you to read relevant documents of the time. In 1945-47 there was no choice, and turning antagonistic before 1956 would mean Porkkala as Russian-controlled Guantanamo.

          • londonscandie

            Glad to see you’ve maintained your sense of humour and don’t take everything literally.

          • mladenm

            Ah, great… I got scared you are one of Neocon sycophants… You know old joke from Radio Yerevan in *old* times?

            How you can crush hedgehog by bare bottom?
            1) shave the hedgehog
            2) use someone else bottom
            3) if your party commands you.

  • Dan Greene

    Nor would it repair relations with Moscow. For the Kremlin’s appetite will not be satisfied by a Finlandized Ukraine; it will next demand similar arrangements for all the countries in its “near abroad.”

    Utter nonsense. What countries is this little weasel Kirchick talking about? It’s interesting that he doesn’t actually list even one.

    In any case, “Findlandization” is a straw-man argument. If the EU and US had been interested and willing to come up with some money, they could have matched the Russian economic support Ukraine that Putin offered and devised a cooperative solution that could have obviated all that has come since. Finland is nothing more than a distraction from the real issue at hand.

  • mladenm

    I remember also that in Italy, Christian Democrats were kept in power despite growing corruption, since alternative would have been Communist – led government. Regarding Ukraine, NATO would be seen in the East only as occupying force, with sole purpose to keep them inside of country treating them as second-rate citizens

  • Пану Хёґлюнд

    There are minor gaffes here. One I would like to point out. “The Gulag Archipelago” was not subject to censorship: it was refused by the publishing house of Solzhenitsyn’s earlier books. The first volume was indeed published in Sweden, but readily available in Finland. The other volumes thoug were substantially delayed and only published in 1980/81 by a much less prestigious company (but in Finland).

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