Fedor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in Global Affairs, remarked in a presentation to London’s Centre for European Reform on October 8 that Ukraine is a state, not a nation. This is a fairly typical Russian observation, often intended to suggest that Ukraine is not quite legitimate as a separate entity. It is also a formula that could be applied to a number of UN member states including, if one wanted to do so, the Russian Federation or the United Kingdom. Both after all from time to time try to define what it means to be Russian or British, respectively, without reaching any very clear conclusion.
Moscow has since President Yanukovich assumed office in Kyiv steadily ratcheted up its pressure on Ukraine to weaken its ties to the West and to increase its dependence on Russia. In doing so it has failed to recognize the harm that Russia had already done to its reputation in its neighborhood by the way it treated Ukraine from Kuchma’s departure in 2003 to Yanukovich’s eventual election in 2010. This was no way to treat Russia’s “little brother.” That would have been true even if the Russians had been right to suppose, as they still do, that Ukrainians in truth either understand themselves to fall in that sort of category, or can be compelled if ignorant of it by Moscow to recognize their real destiny of a close identity with Russia and its interests.
Moscow’s longed for brotherly reconciliation with Kyiv—as it still is, not Kiev—has been frustrated even under Yanukovich, the man the Russians wanted to see elected as “theirs.” Threats of what might happen, or even what will happen if Moscow makes good on them, if Kyiv signs an Association Agreement with the European Union on November 28–29 in Vilnius have only stiffened Ukraine’s resolve to do just that, and, what is still more remarkable, built up EU resolve also to go ahead. Russian policy cannot be fully rationalized by the Kremlin’s need for Ukraine to join their planned Eurasian Union. There is an emotional blind spot here which has prevented Moscow from the flexibility and patience that would have served its purposes better. There can after all be no guarantee that the signature of an EU/Ukraine agreement in Vilnius this November will proceed over the years to its full and successful implementation.
What Russia seeks is dominance. The supranational machinery of the Customs Union/Eurasian Union is one reality. But the underlying reality of direction, or at the least would-be direction, from Moscow has been evident enough in the build-up to the November 28–29 Vilnius meeting between the European Union and its Eastern European Partnership counterparts. Belarus has had its differences with Russia, including in recent months. Kazakhstan has been more circumspect. But neither country has targeted Ukraine or Moldova, or Armenia for that matter, as Russia has. There may indeed be some satisfaction in Minsk or Astana that the going has been rough for Moscow. The projected Eurasian Union is not a partnership of equals. The Russian official rhetoric promoting it, moreover, sits ill with the calls in the country for restrictions on immigration by persons of non-Russian appearance, and high level hints of sympathy with such a mood.
The Russians point out that some 50 percent of Ukraine’s exports are to the Russian market, argue that there is a natural interest of both countries in building on their mutual Soviet inheritance, and assert that Moscow will have a duty to protect itself from a flood of cheap EU imports through Ukraine if that country signs up to an Association Agreement. But will it really be the case after a Vilnius signature that Russia will need or want to protect its industries or consumers from Ukrainian exports? The Soviet inheritance and its associated patterns of trade is something that needs transcending, not preserving, both in Ukraine and Russia—Belarus too for that matter. And how real is the prospect of a threatened increase in EU imports to Russia through Ukraine because of an Association Agreement? These sorts of arguments imply that the planned Eurasian Union would be a protectionist bloc, not a center of innovative excellence that would serve Ukrainian interests, or Russian ones for that matter.
The European Union will of course also be taking risks on board if it agrees to sign on to Association with Ukraine at Vilnius, and to a lesser extent in relation to other signatory countries too. Implementation of its terms and spirit by Kyiv will be of critical importance. But there is no need for anyone in the West to accept the terms of the discussion set out by Moscow. It is Russia which has posed the issue in Manichaean terms, not the European Union: signing an Association Agreement is not a rejection of Russia but an acceptance of EU norms with the prospect of eventual membership. The European Union has had a decent working relationship with Russia, not one of political rivalry over contested geographical space. It is in no one’s interests to turn it into something else.
There have been those in the West who have suggested that Russian aspirations to cement a claim to special rights over a sphere of influence in what used to be the Soviet Union should be respected, whether tacitly or more or less explicitly. The road to Vilnius has illustrated why this would be not just wrong but also mistaken. Forcing Ukraine into a Moscow mandated Eurasian Union would not just injure Ukraine. Ukraine, for a start, would be a difficult member of such a body. But arguably, and more importantly, the result of forcing it to join at Moscow’s imperious demand would directly injure Russia by reinforcing the political and economic status quo, which is proving to be the barrier to the better future the Russian people surely deserve.
The European Union has a difficult choice to make. Ukraine has accepted a series of improvements to its democratic structures as part of the proposed Association Agreement. There is a bankable degree of popular support for strengthening the country’s links with Western Europe. But a durable solution to the matter of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s politically motivated imprisonment still has to be reached. That is emblematic of the distance that remains for Ukraine to travel before it truly adopts EU norms of political or economic conduct. If an Association Agreement is signed on November 28–29—which is the current prospect—the European Union will have its courage and commitment tested in ensuring that Ukraine lives up to its commitments over the years. The same qualities will be needed in facing up to the pressure Moscow will certainly bring to bear to undermine both the ratification and the implementation of such an Agreement. It will help in the latter task if, as is more than likely, Moscow continues to overplay its hand.