The dispute over Edward Snowden—if anyone still remembers him—gave us the chance to slough off the mindset constraining Western policy towards Russia. How Western nations proceed over Syria will show how far that chance is developed.
The US “reset” was a reset to factory mode, not a fresh beginning, and the factory was built to Cold War specifications, however modified in the meantime. It was taken as such in Moscow and seen among other things as an American recantation of the sins of the Bush era. Its fundamental architecture rested on the belief that there is and indeed ought to be a balance of power between the United States and Russia secured by equivalent nuclear capabilities. Hence the acclaim for the mutual reductions agreed to at Prague. But the fact is that even if the United States reduced its nuclear forces to a quarter or less of what Russia might have, it would still be able to destroy its adversary. (Or vice-versa of course, but Russia would not dream of making reductions like that).
The idea of a U.S.-Russia balance of power is dear to Moscow, and the concept of a nuclear equivalence on both sides is, for the Russians, its central element. Russia will persist in the claim that it is special. Its Cold War assumptions as to its rights and status are at the heart of Russia’s idea of itself, though they also confine it. Hence in part its emphatic difference with several Western capitals over Syria, its refusal to work further on nuclear arms reductions, and its search to entrench Russia and as many of its neighbours as can be coerced into forming a separate grouping. It is, further, domestically useful to the present Russian regime to regard the outside world, meaning of course mainly the West, as hostile, and the supposition that the rest of us have it in for Moscow is more than skin deep. But there is no great need for outside powers to be much influenced by it if Russia chooses to sulk, and certainly no profit in trying to ingratiate ourselves with Moscow in advance as insurance against that risk. It hasn’t worked before, and it will not do so now.
Russia is important to the countries of the West, but so are others. Russia is not, and cannot again be, the other half of a world-shaping relationship with the United States, and by extension with a Western Alliance led, though not governed, by the United States. Whatever it thinks of itself, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Tactical gains under the “reset” were welcome to the United States, Russia and many European countries. But nothing has happened in the meantime to burnish the hope that in paying special and flattering attention to Russia Washington would be able to put more substance into the bilateral relationship. President Obama’s decision to forgo the chance of a one-on-one with President Putin this September was not the cancellation of a “Summit” but his recognition that it would have been a disagreeable waste of time. This is new, as was Obama’s criticism of Putin’s human rights record.
There is of course some risk that the Syria crisis will revivify the idea that Moscow and Washington have a directing role to play still. Moscow is Assad’s essential backer. But Russia is prevented by that role from promoting any settlement except one confirming Assad’s continued rule. Moscow is to that extent the victim of its Syrian ally, and Putin has been compelled to deny what he must know to be true as to the gas murders in Damascus. Russia’s President will play the role of independent arbiter as far as he can, but you do not have to read the small print to spot his equivocations.
U.S. and other Western policy makers are free to judge on a case by case basis, paying due regard to Russia’s domestic realities, what to do about individual international matters that also involve Russia. Special and overriding attention to a now threadbare overarching bilateral relationship is not now needed. Whatever the rhetoric, there is no need to seek particular ways to “punish” Russia, and I do not believe that to be the intention of any Western country. But nor does the West need to shut its eyes to Russia’s governance and human rights failings, its cavalier attitude toward its treaty obligations, or its bullying tactics towards its neighbours—notably Ukraine at present. There is nothing “Cold War” about treating Russia like any other country. You could indeed argue that it would be a compliment.
So, fresh and objective thinking about Russia and, what is particularly important, the countries around it will now in principle be easier than it was a few weeks ago. The United States and others of us will wish to do business with Russia where we can. But none of us either should or must allow that country the unique right it has both claimed and often exercised to set the terms of our dialogue.