The presidency of Venezuela is now technically vacant, and the country’s erstwhile dictator, Nicolas Maduro, who had again installed himself as leader after a rigged vote, is—for the moment—out on a limb. As massive protests rock the capital, Juan Guaidó, President of the National Assembly, has declared himself Interim President and has been recognized by 14 Western Hemisphere nations, including the United States and Canada. Striking back, Maduro has given U.S. diplomats 72 hours to leave Venezuela, while the United States has countered that its core personnel will remain because an illegitimate government cannot break diplomatic relations. Once those three days have passed, it is most likely that Maduro will remain at the helm, surrounded by the remnants of his repressive, corrupt narcostate.

Recognizing Guaidó as the legitimate President is a bold strategy, but one that is unlikely to work in the long run. U.S. policymakers are still uncertain whether the protests in Venezuela are motivated by personal support for the relatively unknown Guaidó or by general opposition to Maduro. There is also a much deeper problem: Maduro has transformed the institutions of Venezuela’s government into deeply ramified networks channeling corruption and criminality, and connecting him to other authoritarian regimes such as Cuba, Russia, and China, backsliding states such as Nicaragua and Turkey, and enablers within the United States and other established democracies, such as bankers and realtors who help launder illicit funds.

A comprehensive approach to reconstructing democracy in Venezuela requires uprooting the illicit networks and combatting “authoritarian learning,” the process by which dictatorships share “best practices” in corruption and repression. Venezuela began developing and hardening networks with Cuba during the Chavez-era, but Maduro’s growing relations with other actors like Russia, Turkey, and transnational criminal organizations play an important role here, too. Even Hezbollah came out with a public statement of support for Maduro.

For the United States and its partners striving to return Venezuela to the community of nations, the right call is to back up with serious policy what until now has been a game of thrones. That begins not with veiled threats of “appropriate actions” (whatever those are), but concerted support for the remaining diplomatic personnel and installations. One possible counter-attack for Maduro will be to deploy his Russian-style paramilitary colectivos to attack those institutions (with plausible deniability). Another option, outlined by Diosdado Cabello, head of the Maduro-controlled Constituent Assembly, would be to cut off electricity and starve U.S. diplomats—a strategy at which the Maduro regime excels.

It’s key to understand the deeper forces at work when facing a challenge such as Venezuela. Authoritarians such as Maduro survive by ensuring that those close to them are fat and happy, while keeping those who oppose them hungry and weak. They do whatever it takes to maintain a monopoly on power: bribing foreign and domestic officials, pilfering the state-owned oil company (PDVSA) to the tune of $350 billion and laundering the profits abroad, creating a “sovereign” cryptocurrency (the “Petro”) to evade sanctions, and contracting with criminal organizations to cover their tracks along the way. This is in stark contrast to democratic systems that disperse power through institutions, governing through imperfect (yet transparent) public policy.

In the highly unlikely event that Maduro steps down voluntarily, the authoritarian-corruption nexus into which he has thrust Venezuelan institutions and elites will continue to work to co-opt the highly fractured opposition in the Assembly. Some Assembly members are already lost, others implicated in corruption, and many unwilling to bear the serious risks of confronting Maduro—imprisonment, exile, and even death.

U.S. policy should make it clear to Maduro that he ultimately has three choices: self-exile to the land of one of his authoritarian patrons, hold new and legitimate elections that he would surely lose, or face another onslaught of U.S. sanctions and indictments, including cutting off Venezuela’s oil imports and issuing Interpol notices for the arrest of regime insiders. Levying sanctions and hunkering down in the American Embassy may feel like a delaying tactic, but it buys the United States more time to map out a strategy to unravel the tangled web that could keep authoritarianism alive long after the dictator is gone.

Fortunately, the constellation of center-right governments now in power in Latin America allows the United States to lead a deepened regional commitment to dismantling the illicit networks that have hidden Maduro’s assets and helped him maintain power. Along with Colombia and the new Brazilian government, which is eager to become the epicenter of anti-Chavismo, the United States can play a key role in helping the opposition establish new transitional institutions and deliver humanitarian aid to suffering Venezuelans.

The United States must begin thinking long-term. Toppling Maduro requires more than a challenger, and democracy is about far more than changing the leader. Saving Venezuela will require humanitarian aid, patient institution building, and a transition from reliance on illicit networks to a formal and more transparent market economy.