At last, Libyans have reason to hope for the better, if not the best: After years of turmoil, blood, and venom, rival Libyan factions last Tuesday in Paris agreed to an electoral timetable for presidential elections. Although ambitious, this process, which calls for constitutional mending by September and a ballot by December, constitutes the first time since the collapse of the Qaddafi regime under Western military pressure that the country has had a clear roadmap to political stabilization.
All key internal actors of the Libyan crisis have committed themselves to accepting the results of these elections, a critical step in the country’s rise to a democratic normalcy that it has never known. As such, it is a development of historical importance and a political landmark both for Libya and for the plan’s main architect, French President Emmanuel Macron. Working with the UN Special Representative, Macron has invested significant political capital in this stabilization initiative since his May 2017 election, holding a first gathering at La Celle Saint Cloud this past July, and then gently nudging each faction leader and their supporting countries toward an agreeable framework leading to a presidential election. To put matters into useful perspective, a little less than two years ago the Libyan situation was considered intractable, faction leaders were seemingly irreconcilable, and the country was believed to be on the verge of fracturing permanently under pressure from ISIS and rival efforts to control the territory and its oil reserves.
Without doubt, many pitfalls lay between the agreement and a credible and inclusive Libyan presidential election. Not least, the security situation, not yet under firm control, may deteriorate severely without prior notice. The situation is a spoiler’s paradise. Some of the factions’ heavy-handed fighting tactics were on display in the Cyrenaican city of Derna even as talks were under way in the Palais de l’Elysée. Faction leaders on each side also need to refrain from acting on their worst instincts and to continue supporting and enabling the French roadmap under UN supervision. This is only natural and normal because, ultimately, it will be up to Libyans and their leaders to redeem the promise in the French initiative. Outsiders can do only so much, and of course, as the Libya case teaches, it is far easier for them to create a mess than to clean one up.
The presidential statement adopted on June 6 by the UN Security Council has already shown an important degree of international consensus in support of this election roadmap. Key countries now need to bring this effort further forward. A broader, more integrated UN mission closely interweaved with other international support should be considered; the current UNSMIL format needs to evolve in anticipation of the constitutional and electoral processes. The UN’s various financial and technical instruments could benefit from a more unified approach and focus in support of the new roadmap.
The European Union, for its part, should consider an increase in its financial and technical support, both in the electoral and in the CSDP-related fields. Elections are extremely complex and costly by nature, technical expertise is essential to their success, and security imperatives add an extra layer of expenses and skills.
The U.S. government, whose chargé d’affaires and AFRICOM commander met Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj right after the Paris conference, should increase its financial commitment to the stabilization of Libya, both directly and through the various international stability funds already set up. But Washington should also support the process politically by rallying critical additional international support around the tight calendar adopted as part of the Paris Conference.
Clearly, the Libyan electoral roadmap now needs to be actively supported by all state actors who wish to see a stable Libya emerge, and the reasons for the necessary exertions are obvious. At the forefront of this effort should be the EU member states, all of which share a deep interest in stopping the uncontrolled flow of economic migrants, too often jettisoned to their doom from the Libyan shore by unscrupulous criminal networks. While some EU members may entertain divergences of opinion with France on the Libyan situation and may be tempted to jockey for influence with various faction leaders, they would be wiser to help build an international consensus in order to support actively the electoral process. They would be wise to do so in political terms of course, but also in terms of technical and financial assistance, as in countries such as Afghanistan.
Further south, Sub-Saharan African countries have a vested interest in stabilizing their troublesome northern neighbor. The flow of drugs and weapons back and forth from Libya throughout the Sahel sub-region, while benefiting some local economic and political actors, is chiefly a boon for terrorism, economic inequality, and political instability.
Russia, too, which has exhibited a keen interest, among other things, in supporting Khalifa Haftar—who is, perhaps ironically, a former CIA partner and Langley, Virginia neighbor—also can play a constructive role in the stabilization process alongside EU member states, and thus act upon its professed foreign policy principles.
As for the U.S. government, it shares a particularly weighty responsibility for the current condition of the country, having furnished the tip of the spear that struck the Qaddafi regime in March 2011. Any normal U.S. administration would be concerned with all of the aforementioned political and security equities, not least because they affect the security of key allies. It would also have an interest in deterring the Russians from playing spoiler from the outside. It would want to help the European Union to regulate the flow of migrants legal and illegal alike, which it is hard-pressed to do with Libya in “gray zone” chaos. It would also realize that as the main contributor to the international security commons, the stability of Libya is essential for Sub-Saharan Africa to focus peacefully on its sustainable growth and poverty reduction. And it would understand that the United States cannot afford another deteriorating security situation in the Mediterranean/Levant zone as it focuses on other parts of the world, not least because it affects U.S. counterterrorism efforts in and beyond Libya.
The question is, will the current U.S. Administration act normally in this case? It is time for all interested and capable actors, the United States above all, to step up their commitment and to actively support the Libyan political roadmap. Certainly, Washington’s response will be read, not least in Europe, as indicating policy preferences that go far beyond Libya.