Presidential transitions are almost always messy, frequently contentious, and possibly risky for the nation at large. While this problem applies to some degree in all cabinet-level departments and agencies, the problem is particularly acute within the White House, especially in the area of national security. The National Security Council (NSC) staff serves at the pleasure of the President, and there is usually a complete turnover in personnel between Democratic and Republican Administrations and (vice versa). “Hostile takeovers” often occur, too, when the incoming President is of the same party as the outgoing one.
One critical problem that frequently arises is that all work products of the NSC staff, chronological files, subject files, meeting notes, correspondence, and incoming and outgoing messages to other departments and agencies—indeed, just about anything a working professional might need to go about his or her business—belongs to the outgoing President. That means that in the final days of an Administration permanent NSC staff who work in the communications center come into staff members’ offices with dollies to cart away all their papers, their hard drive, and so on, since they are the President’s property, to be housed eventually in his Presidential library.
That was as I experienced it in 1980 and 1981, with the changeover between the Carter and Reagan Administrations. I had been working throughout the fall of 1980 on the “Gray List,” which was a list of stiff economic sanctions that NATO countries would put into effect in the event that the Soviet Union invaded Poland, which seemed likely at the time. I pleaded successfully with the NSC Legal Advisor to hold onto my working files on this matter so that the incoming Administration would have immediate access to information, recommendations, and decisions already taken in Washington and other NATO capitals. I drafted a memorandum outlining the agreed actions the U.S. government would take in the event of such an invasion that Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron signed on January 19, 1981, the day before President Carter left office. But this was only one area where the incoming Administration might have benefited from work already done, even if it chose to take another policy route.
A second, and arguably even more important consideration, is the need for incoming NSC staff members to have the proper security clearances so that they can begin their work immediately. Almost all staff require Top Secret Codeword clearances, which usually entails a full FBI field investigation that can take weeks, if not months, to complete. My experience with keeping the file on the “Gray List” was an example of this. On January 19, 1981, incoming National Security Advisor Richard Allen informed the Carter NSC staff that they should plan on returning to their home agencies if they were on detail to the White House, or find alternate employment if they were direct hires of the NSC. After the meeting, I mentioned to Allen that I had been working on the sanctions project and asked whether he wanted my help on a temporary basis as he assembled the new team. I noted that I had an ongoing assignment in the Foreign Service for the coming summer. Allen said, “Yes, come back on the 21st and continue to manage that portfolio for us.”
Well, having dismissed the Carter staff, it turned out that only two of us, Jim Rentschler and I, both Foreign Service Officers, had the required clearances for the various regional offices. As a result, over the next few weeks, Jim and I divided up the world after the inevitable morning call from Allen or his top assistant about some other area where they needed staff support.
As a result, I was involved in issues for which I had had no previous responsibility, including Soviet political affairs and Central and South America. I organized the first two cabinet-level meetings of the NSC with President Reagan in the chair, preparing the agenda, taking the notes, and ensuring necessary follow-up actions. The main issues for both of these meetings were the Soviet threat to Poland, Poland’s debt crisis and danger of default, and Central America. The latter question was especially important for the President because of commitments and statements he had made during the campaign.
In the meeting, President Reagan made it absolutely clear that, if necessary, he was going to order the Air Force to shoot down any aircraft coming out of Cuba with arms destined for Nicaragua and ultimately for the rebels in El Salvador. Since I was the note taker, I went up to Richard Allen after the meeting and asked if he really wanted the President’s comments on this matter in the official record, which I thought unwise. He agreed and said, “No, let’s leave that out of the meeting summary.”
I inadvertently got myself ensnared in another matter involving Nicaragua. My wife Jill, who had joined the Arnold and Porter law firm in 1979, worked closely with Paul Reichler, a partner who, among other things, represented the Sandinistas in Washington. Just by chance, about ten days into the Administration, Paul and his fiancée invited Jill and me to dinner at his house. Since I knew about his role regarding Nicaragua, and knew further that he was on his way to Managua to meet with Daniel Ortega, I called the State Department and spoke with the Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of Central American affairs. I told him I was having dinner with Reichler and asked if there was any kind of message I should pass on to him in light of his forthcoming trip to Managua. He said yes and gave me some talking points, the gist of which was that Reichler should tell Ortega, “These guys are serious about stopping the gun-running into El Salvador.” Further, “The Nicaraguans had better take these warnings seriously or it was going to come down on their heads.”
I dutifully passed this message on to Reichler. Within days, the U.S. Ambassador in Managua sent in a searing message to Washington, claiming that, “It’s been only two weeks into this Administration and already there is a separate line of communication that’s been established with the Sandinistas. Who’s doing this and why?” When Richard Allen saw the message, he called me over to the White House and asked, “How in hell did this happen and what was your role in it?” I explained to him what had happened, that I had operated on the basis of talking points supplied by State, which thought it a great idea to pass on a tough message to Ortega and the Sandinistas. The State Department finally squared things with the U.S. Ambassador in Managua, and Allen begrudgingly accepted my account. In retrospect, I probably should not have taken such an initiative on my own, but I was convinced by the strong language used in the NSC Principals meeting that a warning to the Sandinistas was in order.
Here is another example of what can happen when the NSC is understaffed and “holdovers” finds themselves in some strange positions. In 1981, the CIA was totally demoralized after four years of Admiral Stansfield Turner at the helm of the Agency. He had taken a meat axe to the Operations Directorate of the CIA, firing hundreds of experienced case officers and field operatives. Allen wanted to offer some words of encouragement to the officers still on board and was committed to either meet with them himself or send someone higher up in the NSC food chain. I don’t know how I drew the short straw, but I was dutifully dispatched to Langley to deliver some soothing words.
On this occasion, I received only minimal guidance from Allen’s front office, but I was allowed to tell those officers that the Reagan Administration was outraged at their treatment by the previous Administration and could now rest assured “that covert operations were back on the table—big time.” I had little else to say, but those few words seemed to bring a lot of cheer to the CIA officers assembled. For me personally, it was an odd message delivered by an even odder messenger.
This brief account of one mid-level Foreign Service Officer’s experience in an NSC transition process ought, with any luck at all, to energize future National Security Advisors to: allow incoming staff to have some access to the work product of the outgoing Administration, if only on a temporary basis; and expedite the selection of new staff so they can hit the ground running and not have to rely on “holdovers” who may not have the required geographical or technical expertise to do the job properly. The national security challenges this country faces in 2017 are more complex, more varied, and more risky than ever. This is no time for an “amateurs’ hour.”