The dismissal of Georgian Defense Minister, Irakli Alasania, in early November, followed by a cascade of resignations by ministers and deputies, was disturbing for observers in Western capitals. Those who resigned are well known; they are perceived as strongly pro-Western and served as important interlocutors between Georgia and the West. It is undeniable that figures such as Alasania, former Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze, and the former minister for Euro-Atlantic integration, Alexi Petriashvili, furthered Georgia’s Western trajectory, but this movement precedes them. Georgia’s identification with Europe is decades old and ingrained in the minds of citizens and politicians alike. The departure of individual politicians cannot change this.

Nonetheless, a recent article in The American Interest, authored by Svante Cornell, one of the best analysts of the South Caucasus and a staunch supporter of Georgia, rehashed a theme that has been all too common in recent articles and reflections on Georgian politics. He wondered whether these events indicate that Georgia is “slipping away” from its Euro-Atlantic trajectory. In the wake of Alasania’s dismissal, the Georgian elite has found itself once again rebutting this claim and restating its allegiance to the West. This pattern of doubt and reassurance occurs all too frequently, demonstrating problems within the domestic political landscape in Georgia and with the West’s impression of the country and its politicians. The Western perception that Georgia’s commitment to the West is fleeting and unstable is problematic in that it undermines Georgia’s integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, encourages troublemaking by politicians, weakens citizens’ faith in their government, and creates insecurity in Georgia’s relations with Russia.

Georgia’s pro-Western trajectory does not depend any single politician; pro-Western credentials are the rule, rather than the exception, and there are few politicians of the pro-Kremlin type. Yet Westerners tend to view the post-Soviet republics as the Russian near abroad. Georgia’s peaceful transfer of power in October 2012 was viewed with suspicion, as a potential gain for pro-Kremlin forces in Tbilisi. Once again, in November 2014, Alasania’s dismissal was deemed the conclusion to yet another dramatic East-West encounter.

Georgia’s domestic political weaknesses are in large part to blame for this dynamic. In Georgia, politicians often treat trivial issues as if they were substantial, in order to imbue interpersonal grudges with deeper national and strategic significance. The Georgian political establishment often fails to address substantive challenges and transcend personal squabbles to produce relevant public policy. However, Georgia’s pro-Western foreign policy trajectory is not up for debate.

There are two reasons why these internal political issues are construed as part of a dramatic geopolitical encounter. The first reason is domestic. In Kutaisi, where Georgia’s parliament is currently based, most differences between parties relate to politics rather than policies. Georgia’s political system is personality-centered, and when it comes to policies, there usually is consensus. Parties differ in terms of priorities, not vision. That is why the discussion tends to focus on a leader’s personal morals, and to his or her academic, religious, professional, and even physical traits. Parties are often associated with a single individual and are evaluated on the basis of individual personality traits.

It is important to note how the current parliament and government came about. The Georgian Dream Coalition was initially a human rights front, with diverse political parties uniting against the human rights abuses of Mikheil Saakashvili’s regime. This was a solid foundation for an anti-UNM alliance, but it did not translate into a solid political platform, as personal differences often emerged. Since there is too broad a consensus on basic policy choices, inter-party feuds become a beauty contest of pro-Western credentials. Many Georgian politicians would like Western allies to believe that they are individually unique and critical partners, without whom Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory would crumble. Surprisingly, the West seems very willing to believe that some of them are indeed exceptional.

This brings us to the second reason for East-versus-West drama in Georgian politics: managing the relationship with Russia. At one point in time, each political faction in Georgia has advocated rapprochement with Russia. This vein of political thought was reinvigorated with the famous “reset” button presented by then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Few remember that President Saakashvili, in his early days, also advocated for rapprochement. Alasania expressed his support for “confidence-building measures” many times. This is a logical position. Russia and Georgia are locked in an asymmetrical standoff: Georgia pays the price in terms of security and trade, while tens of thousands of Georgians residing in Russia are victimized. Insofar as geography is a variable independent of policy, Georgia will try to ameliorate its relationship with its largest neighbor when it can.

Of course, Moscow dictates the terms of any dealings with Tbilisi. This often means that Georgia can only deal with Russia if it accepts that its sovereignty is limited. No Georgian leader can admit this publicly. But Georgian politicians also have to pretend that they differ from each other; if they reveal their basic strategic foreign policy consensus, the lack of fundamental political cleavages would be revealed. Georgian politicians do not want this to happen. As a result, whenever arguments arise in the Georgian domestic arena, outside observers tend to interpret them as part of deep division between pro-Westerners and supporters of Russia. A happy ending is almost guaranteed, since there is genuine consensus in Georgia about the pro-European foreign policy trajectory. Many observers in the West are taken in by these performances, imagining divisions where they do not exist and encouraging future repeats of this cycle.

There are, of course, certain darker sides to this drama. Georgia’s restoration of a system of checks and balances, and the official response to popular demands for justice, was largely described in the West as “retributive justice.” This is incorrect. Saakashvili’s allies in the West have been swift to portray judicial reforms as a sinister “pro-Russian” move. Once again, as soon as Alasania’s dismissal was announced, observers began to look for a “pro-Kremlin” twist to the story. For instance, observers recalled that several ministers with substantial powers in the first Georgian Dream cabinet were “personal friends” of the Prime Minister or had held positions during the “Shevardnadze era.” This would rather amusingly suggest that Prime Ministers routinely appoint their enemies, that Shevardnadze was not a pro-Western leader, and that Georgia has such an abundance of human resources that its leaders can afford to pursue retributive campaigns with every change of guard.

There are at least two good reasons to stop dramatizing every political encounter in Georgia as a chapter in an East-versus-West drama. First: Georgian democracy will not be consolidated without disagreements over the rules of the democratic “game.” It will be successful when parties are stronger than individual personalities and when campaigns are lost or won on the basis of issues and policies.  It is not the absence of consensus but the lack of substantive cleavages that threaten Georgian democracy.

Second: By claiming that there are opposing camps of pro-Western and pro-Russian politicians in Georgia, Georgia’s allies are not helping the country progress along its pro-Western trajectory. In turn, the public would largely like to see the amelioration of relations with Moscow, which is also considered desirable in Washington and Brussels. To constantly question the policy consensus, and pretend that there is political substance in interpersonal encounters, is to play with fire. This could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The bottom line is that Georgia is often treated as Russia’s near abroad, even though it is a sovereign state. Such treatment is dangerous, especially when it comes from allies.

This recent drama offers important lessons. No single Georgian politician is crucial to the country’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory, and Georgia’s Western allies should not reward claims to the contrary. Institutions matter far more than individuals, and Georgia’s pro-Western stance has been institutionalized at the deepest level. Furthermore, Georgia needs to be allowed to move through its democratic transformation without worrying that every mistake will be interpreted as a sign of an anti-Western plot. Georgia can be an instrumental force for stability and security in the region and along Europe’s expanding borders, but trust and patience are needed as this process unfolds.