Thinking back to the late 1990s, I should start with a compliment. Recall the mainstream thinking of those years, when the evolution of a post-Soviet system was expected to deliver the final proof for the magic working of instant democracy and shock therapy; now here comes Thomas Graham, breaking from the established code of interpretation with “economic reformers” being the safest bet in town—and he dares to analyze post-Soviet political elites in terms of “clans.” Graham caused quite a stir among those gullible believers in a swift and soft landing for Russia after “transformation.”
Times have changed, Russia has been “stabilized” (at a price), but we still can’t see into its opaque political system to understand its core mechanics. The linear extrapolation of the current situation—that is, the idea that Putin and the gang will be able to hold on to power for the rest of our days—is neither plausible nor inspiring. While this is no different from other parts of the world where social and political tensions are growing, Russia’s leadership is unwilling to consider even the possibility of systemic change. Comments, suggestions, and criticism from the sidelines are delegitimized as intervention, leaving discussion of political reform for dissidents. Are we back to square one?
Graham interprets my skepticism regarding Western influence as “despair”, a conclusion justified only if we were expecting immediate impact as the only acceptable measure for success. Like most Russia-watchers, I am frustrated, not desperate. Having worked for 25 years close enough to the process of Soviet/Russia-policy in Germany, I learned that, as a rule, politicians (not only Germans, I am sure) would prefer to have their mental map confirmed rather than challenged by some specialist who wants to discuss the possibility of different outcomes.
No, I have no magic formula to bridge the gap between reason and ideology on all sides. But Graham’s description of political decision-making in the United States leaves me wondering about the kind of experts who have been shaping Russia policy over the past ten years. In his words,
while politicians may influence it, policy is made in the Executive Branch, where the national security apparatus is dominated by professionals somewhat removed from the day-to-day political whirlwind.
Three paragraphs earlier he puts all the blame for a “gap between high level statements expressing a desire for cooperation and on-the-ground, dead-serious competition [with Russia]” on senior officials’ having “delegated the interpretation and implementation of policy to lower levels, where the view of Russia as a competitor has been widespread and more passionately held.” On top of all of this, “the President could not—or would not—[keep discipline in the American national security apparatus] on a matter that was evidently not near the top of his concerns”.
This statement by an insider not only represents the final proof for the general theory of “One-Issue Capitals”; even worse, it is bound to jeopardize the trust among allies and friends who have stood in admiration of the sophistication of analysis and have believed in the stringency of decision-making in Washington, where politics was indeed just a “whirlwind.”
White House-watchers in the Kremlin who still cherish the old rivalry must have been delighted by Mitt Romney’s declaration that Russia is America’s “number one geopolitical foe”; it revealed an American conservative mindset that was the mirror image of their own worldview. To be sure, Romney did not lose the race for the presidency because of Russian issues. But let’s imagine that he did win, and that, say, John Bolton ended up as Secretary of State… Unlike any of his predecessors, this Democratic President faces more constraints than options in his foreign agenda, for domestic reasons.
To portray U.S. relations with Russia as a “competition” is certainly to overstate the Russian potential in almost every dimension of power. On the other hand, conservatives seem unable to resist the temptation to describe Russia as a potential threat to national security, remarks usually made for public consumption and/or to undercut the Executive Branch. In my view this is the most plausible explanation for the loss of momentum in U.S.-Russia policies regarding missile defense and nuclear disarmament, which have been moved to the back burner of the President’s agenda, along with other pots simmering in the current dysfunctionality (not my wording) of the political process. In this environment, New START was a remarkable achievement, but the follow-up was not.
Each and every minute wasted on the old tit-for-tat is a minute that could have been spent dealing with runaway financial markets, nuclear proliferation, lack of enforceable controls for trade in conventional weapons, and, on top of it all, the capturing of democratic institutions by commercial interests on a global scale. Why not challenge the Russian leadership to make a concerted effort to tackle these truly strategic issues? Is it because the United States and some Western allies might be embarrassed by national interests of their own standing in the way of the overdue dialogue?
Outsiders may be wondering anyway about the meaning of “strategy”—that is, what the strategist Graham considers as “strategic” in relations with Russia. “Promoting the values and interests of the United States” sounds great. But don’t ask for explicit content, and forget about considering the implicit frictions between the two systems. By the way: What are the specific “interests the United States has in the former Soviet space”?
Like most geostrategists, Graham is carried away in this fashionable fascination with China as a model for authoritarian capitalism. It is more than plausible to assume that the country’s amazing record of economic growth, military power and growing political weight are being carefully studied in Moscow. But Russian analysts cannot ignore the drawbacks of its unavoidable diseconomies of scale—not just financial overheating, but also the social and political tensions that have been building up in China over the past few years. It doesn’t take much imagination to anticipate times of serious trouble already in the medium term. No, authoritarian capitalism is not sustainable because it carries the seeds for its own demise: neglect of the human dimension, which is more than just an economic resource. “They the People” are waking up now that the party of initial growth is ending; they are realizing their power as innovators, entrepreneurs and citizens.
When it comes to shaping relations with contemporary Russia, the specific patterns of cooperation and response do matter, and timing is of the essence. Open and official acts of repression that run against wording and spirit of legally binding agreements signed by Russia in the frameworks of United Nations, OSCE, and above all the Council of Europe, demand open and official criticism from the other signatory powers. The regime’s hysterical reactions even to diplomatically mellow challenges show that holding Russia responsible for meeting those standards is far from irrelevant. And doing any less than this is bound to be seen as an invitation to blackmail and, more importantly, an indicator that Western values are for window-dressing only. The Obama and Putin meetings planned for June and September offer the chance for yet another reset—but this time, one hopes, a real one, focused on the real issues.