It’s Complicated

The errant 2002–03 U.S. intelligence estimate of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian nuclear weapons program are two of the most controversial judgments in the history of the U.S. intelligence community.

Appeared in: Volume 08, Number 5 | Published on: April 12, 2013

Thomas Fingar is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University. This article is adapted from his remarks at the Oxford Union in January 2013, when he received the annual award given by the Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence.

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