The United Nations Security Council acted just in time to forestall a bloodbath in Libya, if it indeed enforces its own resolution. Troops loyal to Muammar Qaddafi have seized almost irreversible momentum in their battle against anti-government rebels, and absent Western action the fall of the rebel capital Benghazi is imminent.
After a period of policy confusion in which the Obama Administration appeared reluctant to intervene in any meaningful way and sent conflicting signals about its intentions, the US government executed a lightning turnaround in favor of military intervention, spurred, most likely, by the prospect of a looming humanitarian catastrophe. With US backing, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized a “no-fly zone” over Libya as well as “all necessary measures” short of occupation to protect civilians, which could include more extensive military measures. Indeed, Under Secretary of State William J. Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 17 that the United States is considering “a whole range of measures” to shield those in the path of Qaddafi’s onslaught.
Even with the Security Council’s action, time may be very close to running out. Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, told an interviewer March 16 that the government’s troops were within 48 hours of Benghazi. Qaddafi himself declared yesterday that the assault on Benghazi would occur that very evening and that “no mercy or compassion” would be shown. The Libyan government hastily announced a ceasefire in response to the Security Council’s action, but military operations continue. The ceasefire declaration is best understood as a delaying action to afford the government time to decide how best to stave off international action while achieving its objectives. In any case, there is an extremely short time frame to mobilize a well-planned international military response.
Let’s be clear about the stakes, which have gotten somewhat short shrift in the debate about whether or not, and in what form, outside powers should intervene.
The consequences of a Qaddafi victory would be extremely serious for the United States and the region. In the first place, the Libyan government is likely to lay waste to large tracts of urban eastern Libya in its effort to retake rebel strongholds, with high civilian casualties and severe damage to neighborhoods and civic infrastructure. A triumphant Qaddafi will take his revenge on the survivors; hundreds if not thousands more are likely to be shot on sight or disappear into Qadaffi’s prisons as rebels, their sympathizers and suspected sympathizers are systematically rounded up. The reports emerging from areas retaken by Libyan forces suggest such retaliation is already taking place.
Those who escape the dragnet, and many others beside, are likely to wash up as refugees on European shores or at the borders of Egypt and Tunisia, where thousands are already trapped; the humanitarian crisis could involve a million or more people.
A vengeful Qaddafi, chafing under the weight of UN sanctions, the threat of indictment by the International Criminal Court, and his burned international bridges has nothing to lose and will, soon enough, lash out against those whom he blames for his troubles: the West, particularly the United States, and America’s Arab allies. Qaddafi could easily return to the pursuit of WMD, as well as the state sponsorship of terrorism which killed hundreds of Americans and those of other nationalities in the 1980s. Saudi Arabia, which orchestrated the GCC’s March 7 call for a no-fly zone over Libya, is another likely target (Qaddafi tried to have Saudi King Abdullah assassinated at the Arab Summit in 2003). Other Arab states which supported the Saudis within the GCC and political figures such as Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa, who arranged the League’s recent endorsement of a no-fly zone and recognition of the rebels as Libya’s legitimate government, could be another target. Qaddafi would very likely seek ways to foment and support anti-government unrest in other Arab states, contributing to regional instability and military tension.
The effects on pro-democracy movements throughout the region cannot be underestimated. These are likely to be felt particularly in Egypt, which shares a lengthy border with Libya, but lessons will be learned by other governments seeking to deal with welling protests. Indeed, the rulers of Bahrain and Yemen, who have stepped up violence against protestors in recent days, seem already to have absorbed these lessons. Potential pro-democracy demonstrators in the rest of the Arab world may well pause before committing themselves to peaceful calls for change, fearing their governments might resort to the Libyan strategy.
Another casualty of a Qaddafi victory would be America’s hopes for supporting a process of orderly reform and democratic transition in the Arab world, and perhaps American Middle East policy itself. Having committed himself to Qaddafi’s ouster, declaring that the Libyan ruler “has lost legitimacy to lead and he must leave,” President Obama must back up his ultimatum or risk looking weak and losing influence with friends and foes alike. Further talk of America’s dedication to Middle East democracy, and admonitions to long-time allies on the need for reform, will be politely ignored. The United States’ opportunity to encourage a historic political shift in the region will vanish, and with it the best argument America has against Al-Qaeda: the power of freedom to win justice and dignity for oppressed peoples.
Thus, if it serious about preventing further bloodshed in Libya and advancing the democracy agenda, the United States must be prepared to seize the permission offered by the Security Council to lead a decisive confrontation with the Brother Leader. The Libyan government’s advance must be retarded, and a “no-fly zone” by itself, at this late date, is unlikely to do the job. Concentrations of Libyan armor and artillery, the main spearhead of Qadaffi’s’ push against the rebels, must be targeted as soon as possible. Additional measures could include cutting government lines of communication and supply and destroying transportation routes between Qaddafi’s forces and Benghazi. The United States should also consider offering diplomatic recognition to the rebels’ National Transitional Council and providing intelligence, tactical military advice and limited arms shipments to its forces.
With or without the UN resolution, Libyan rebels, other Arab states, US allies, and would-be democrats throughout the region are looking for American leadership backed by action. The time for this is now; the stakes are too high to fail.