Sometimes a truth is revealed more by its absence than its presence. So it is with the Gypsy, or Roma, people, whose circumstances tell us more about the broad social and political functions of nationalism than one at first might think.
The Roma are at the bottom of the European ethnic heap, under-housed, undereducated, underemployed, underserved, underrepresented and actively discriminated against by landlords, employers, school administrators and governments. Their fate differs from country to country; Roma appear to be better integrated and more content in Spain, for example, than in Romania.1 But nowhere is their situation good.
At the core of the Roma’s troubles is the fact that they are a people without a land—but with a twist. To say that a people is without a land can mean at least three things. It can mean that, for one reason or another, a people does not in the main live in the land with which it is historically associated. That was true, of course, of the Jews for most of the past 2,000 years. But it has been true, too, for what are sometimes called projection states—states defined by the fact that more members of a particular group live outside their homeland than within it. That was the case for Greeks during much of the 19th century, and it is true for Lebanese and Armenians today.
For a people to be without a land can also refer to a lack of sovereign control over a territory or country in which, in fact, most of the national group does live. That is the case today for the many peoples, including the Kurds, Puerto Ricans, Berber, Baloch, Palestinians, Basques, Aymara and Quechua.
But the Roma are different, if not unique.2 The Roma are “without a land”, and thus by definition without a state, not only because they have no history of attachment to a particular territory, but because Gypsy culture does not value attachment to place.
That is why if you think you know, or if you want to know, where the Roma “really” came from, you are revealing yourself as a Gazo—a non-Gypsy. The first substantive attempt to discover their origin came in 1783, when Heinrich Grellmann of the University of Göttingen demonstrated the similarity of the principal family of Gypsy languages, Romani, to Sanskrit. Other Roma languages are Slavic, but linguistic analysis of languages in the Romani group indicates that Gypsies originated in or around Kashmir or the Punjab. Genetic studies in recent years have substantiated this evidence by demonstrating that, although Gypsies have intermarried as freely as other peoples, most of Europe’s Roma groups can trace an ancestral line to the Subcontinent.
This information has not excited much interest among the Roma, who themselves tell no stories about their geographical origin. They do tell stories about how they have been and still are the target of much discrimination, but even here the Roma operate at a disadvantage: Roma, a term promoted by ethnic activists, is by no means universally accepted by the people it purports to describe. Nor do all Roma think of themselves as forming a single people, a fact reflected in the difficulty of defining who we are describing.
In earlier times, the names used by Gypsies to describe themselves referred to small groups of people, clans for the most part, in the different places they were to be found. The name “Gypsy”, some version of which is used in most European languages, is not a name that Gypsies ever gave themselves, but is rather a term that has stuck among most due to prevalent use by others. It derives from the word for “Egyptian”, and was used by Europeans in earlier centuries to characterize as exotic, Eastern and different the itinerants who begin to appear among them in the late Middle Ages. Thus Gypsies became “Gypsies” in more or less the same way that native Americans became “Indians”—for lack of an obvious alternative by adopting a term invented by outsiders.
By most measures, the Roma are a people, or a nation in the strict sense of the term. They have a dominant language, a culture and, above all, a sense of being a people. As Hans Kohn used to put it, a nation is a group of people that calls itself a nation and gets away with it. But the Roma have sought neither a country nor any form of political sovereignty or government structure for themselves. Roma identity is bound up with the romance of rootlessness. In a way, then, Roma identity takes the anarchist ideal one step further; they reject government by rejecting the territorial sine qua non for it.
The ideal of a life detached from place continues to be powerful even among Roma extended families that have lived in the same village or region for generations. Roma think of themselves as travelers much as Norwegians think of themselves as farmers—a self-conception so important that the Norwegian government spends vast sums to subsidize their now small minority of farmers. And so as Norwegians are farmers, Roma are travelers.
Actual Roma economic systems have varied over time and space. They have been horse traders and trainers, basket makers, metal-smiths, woodworkers, singers and musicians. When dancing bears were a popular spectacle in Europe, Roma led them from town to town. Whatever they did, however, they mostly moved to do it, and itinerancy is crucial to understanding the Gypsy problem. Tolerated across Europe as temporary sojourners providing eclectic but useful services, the Gypsies have never been regarded by themselves or, more to the point of their problem, by anyone else as belonging anywhere.
The ideal of a Roma caravan moving freely over the landscape is the antithesis of the peasant nation rooted in the soil worked by its ancestors. Roma are thus decidedly not farmers, although they have often taken temporary work as field hands. In the early modern period, Roma in the Balkans were forced into slave-like status on large estates. More recently, Communist governments required Roma to abandon their horse-drawn caravans, take factory jobs and move into government housing. Their children were required to attend school. While many of today’s Roma in the former Warsaw Pact countries still work in offices and factories, many others were left with few skills suited to a modern economy when the collapse of Communism led to the shuttering of many factories. Distinctive contemporary Roma occupations today include petty dealing in batch lots of goods that are cheaper on one side of a border than the other, fixing up used cars for sale, and various and sundry scams.
According to anthropologist Michael Stewart, Roma think of their trading activity as the clever outwitting of dull-minded non-Roma. A Roma woman who collects discarded plastic twine behind a factory, lugs it to a village market and sells it to a farmer for use tying up grape vines looks to us like a person who does hard, dirty work for a pittance. However, since she got the twine for nothing and sold it without paying taxes to a farmer foolish enough to pay cash, she and her family see the exchange as an example of the wit and cunning that enable Roma to live without working. Such activities validate the Roma self-conception as a people so clever that they live freely, unlike the oafish hard-working farmers tied to their lands. This understanding stands in stark contrast to the Roma reality of extreme poverty, and it also makes it difficult for Roma who do take regular jobs to maintain their self-esteem and standing within Roma communities.3
From the perspective of European government officials across the continent, the problem with Roma is that many of them live outside the formal economy. The official EU view today is thus not fundamentally different from that imposed by Communist-era governments: The Roma need to get jobs, move into fixed modern housing, have their children inoculated against disease and send them to schools where they will be educated in the national language and prepared to enter the mainstream economy and culture. In short, they should assimilate both to modern life and to the nation-state of which they are citizens.
Assimilation, of course, is a two-way street. The cultural majority has to be willing to accept members of the minority, and the minority group has to be willing to assimilate. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Macedonians, Hungarians, Romanians and other European nations are willing to accept Roma as full members of their nations on the condition that they adopt the national language and culture (and this is a questionable assumption in many cases), we are still left with the other half of the question: Do Roma want to assimilate?
Roma understand their choices. If they speak a Roma language, conduct their lives according to Roma norms, identify as Roma and pass Roma cultural values on to their children, economic opportunities will be limited. But if they take up whatever may be the national language and culture, their children will lose their Roma identity. Unsurprisingly, some Roma embrace the opportunities that assimilation opens while others resist it. The latter choice often means taking irregular work, living in substandard conditions and keeping children out of school.
Some Roma activists assert that the group’s lack of occupational achievement is more apparent than real because many successful Roma conceal their background, which not only adds to a false impression of Roma failure but also deprives young Roma of successful role models. Some non-Roma school administrators assert that Roma school failure stems from shortsighted parents who keep children out of school because they want the money the children earn by working.4 Even if both of these assertions are true, and both might be true, the still larger truth is surely that many Roma cherish their identity and wish to pass it on to their children even as they also wish for economic success.
In other words, Roma are like most minority ethnic groups in the developed world. Ancient ethnic enclaves like that of the Basques and recent immigrant groups in Europe like the North Africans include both those who are eager to assimilate and those who work to preserve cultural continuity. But both types of minority groups also include large numbers of people looking for a middle way that can provide their children with the opportunities that the modern world can offer while ensuring the continuity of a cherished ancestral culture and identity.
The State of Statelessness
There is a political arrangement that secures the opportunity to participate in the modern world within a context of cultural continuity: It’s called the nation-state. Peoples like the Roma who feel that their unique culture is at risk have often worked to establish independent states in which they can control their destiny as a group. Such efforts are conventionally termed national liberation movements, because many of them have worked to liberate colonized territory, whether colonized by Europeans or others from afar, or by closer neighbors. Such movements liberate individuals as well as nations, however. Consider Botswana.
The Tswana (Setswana) people suffer from poverty, one of the world’s highest rates of AIDS and many other problems, yet they are more fortunate than most of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa because Botswana, once part of the British Empire, arose in 1964 as a nation-state in which 80 percent of the people were ethnic Tswana.5 In 2010, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance placed Botswana at the top of the list of mainland African states, ranked according to a set of measures of good governance including security, rule of law, corruption, participation in government, economic opportunity and access to healthcare and education.6 Botswana, then, is a familiar if not all that common political type: a culturally unified nation-state with a more decent government and a better-managed economy than those of comparable states that do not fit the definition of nation-state.
A nation-state like Botswana is bounded in two ways: as a physical territory with a defined border and as a conceptual territory divided between those defined as members and those who are not. These boundaries define a population that shares both rights and obligations. Membership in a nation may confer, for example, an enforceable right to individual freedom of expression, but it also obligates that individual to obey the decisions of the judicial system even when he disagrees with them, to pay the taxes that support the legal system and to be willing to serve in an army raised to defend the state. A nation-state can function only if individuals accept their obligations along with their rights, and functions best when the members of the nation subscribe to a shared set of ideas that they are willing to support and defend.
Not all states liberate individuals in this manner. Many contemporary states lack an ethnic majority, and there are many places with minority groups nested within other minority groups. To live as a member of an ethnic minority is to lack the reciprocal connectedness of the true nation-state, and it is to almost invariably live a dual life. So it is for the Roma, who behave according to Roma norms and perhaps speak a Roma language at home but who must switch to the national language and foreign behavioral norms at work. A Roma nation-state, were one possible, would liberate individual Roma by enabling them to live integrated lives, using the same values, language and assumptions in their private and civic lives.
It is not strictly necessary to have an independent nation-state for its virtues to exist. It may be possible to achieve the kind of functional connectedness associated with nation-states in a semi-autonomous region. The Catalan are attempting to do this, as are the Québécois, and the Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom. Under very different circumstances the Kurds in Iraq have done it, too. Despite brutal ethnic cleansings by the former government of Iraq, and despite the fact that there has been a war going on around them for half a dozen years, Iraqi Kurdistan has a flourishing economy, a measure of personal security and respect for civil rights that has even attracted Christian Arabs forced to flee other parts of Iraq. But it is difficult to imagine how the autonomy option can possibly work for a people, like the Roma, without a territory.
The idea of the nation-state draws its power in part from the reality that, when given the option, people prefer to preserve and pass on the culture, language and identity of their birth. This is something that nation-states allow them to do particularly well. That cultural bond—what social scientists like to call social trust or social capital—also goes far to explain why the nation-state has become a dominant form of political organization: It engenders success. Not only have nation-states been a uniquely effective guarantor of the rights to “liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression”, in the words of the Declaration of the Rights of Man; they have also performed well as guarantors of economic success. In Francis Fukuyama’s words, on the “deepest level” trust is based on shared
phenomena such as family structure, religion, moral values, ethnic consciousness, ‘civic-ness,’ and particularistic historical traditions. Just as democratic institutions rest on a healthy civil society, civil society in turn has precursors and preconditions at the level of culture. Culture can be defined as a rational, ethical habit passed on through tradition.7
It seems to follow that the trust that enables the creation of a successful and well-governed nation-state decreases as cultural diversity increases.8 The larger the proportion of a nation-state’s population made up of groups with different languages, cultures, values and identities, the less social trust there will likely be. This is an equation that goes a long way toward explaining such failed and failing states as Sudan, Yugoslavia, Congo, Kenya and Pakistan. It helps to explain, as well, why countries with large Roma populations are not inclined to offer the Roma a de-territorialized status as a minority, and are certainly not inclined to treat them in such a way that more itinerate Roma will be attracted to them.
Benefits Beyond Borders
The plight of the Roma also illustrates that having a homeland, and particularly having a sovereign state set up and functioning in that homeland, even provides benefits for members of an ethnic group living elsewhere. This raises the complex issue of the rights and status of minorities.
Even nation-states with a substantial ethnic majority upon which the state is based include ethnic enclaves that often predate the modern state. Twenty percent of the people of Botswana are not ethnic Tswana, but their Botswanan citizenship means that they share the benefits of living in a state that is better governed than its neighbors. Japan, one of the most homogeneous of nation-states, also has minorities—Koreans, Ainu, and others—and even though these minorities are discriminated against by Japanese society, they benefit from living in a democratic nation-state. Indeed, democratic nation-states have a good record of protecting the civil rights of minority groups, certainly better than the record of authoritarian or outright despotic ones, though the approaches they take to the task differ. But the Roma don’t fit well in any of these models.
France is the model of a nation-state that protects the civil rights, but not the ethnic continuity, of its minorities. The Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre’s memorable late-18th-century statement of policy, “To the Jews as individuals everything, to the Jews as a nation nothing”, was applied to all non-French ethnic groups, both the historic groups—Bretons, Jews, Occitan, Flemings, Basques and others, who collectively outnumbered ethnic French in Clermont-Tonnerre’s day—and, in later centuries, to immigrant groups. All were slated for assimilation to the French language and nation. This program has had many imitators, republican Turkey being perhaps the purest of the lot. This is the most popular proposal for addressing the Roma problem in Europe today: Individual Roma have rights to the extent they assimilate, but the Roma as a group have no rights.
Other democratic nation-states strive to protect the separate ethnic identities as well as the civil liberties of minority groups. On balance this describes the British “multicultural” approach to minority rights, which applies to immigrant groups with no obvious territory within the UK as well as to Scots, Welsh and Orangemen. It also describes the approach Israel takes with its Druze citizens and that Norway and Sweden take with the nomadic Sami (Laplanders). The Israeli Druze are an interesting group because they participate in civic life and regularly achieve high rank in the Israeli armed forces, government and diplomatic corps, while maintaining cultural continuity in self-governing Druze villages. They are, however, like the Sami, a small population, and in the delicate field of interactions between nation-states and ethnic minorities, size matters. States with large populations of Roma, like Bulgaria and Romania, are unlikely to adopt this approach.
Obviously, the nation-state alternative is not open to all peoples; some cannot form nation-states because they are too small or too scattered. Nor is the autonomous-region approach available in democracies that do not take a multicultural approach to minority issues. Neither approach is available to the Roma, because they have no land on which either kind of solution could be based.
The Roma are clearly more vulnerable as a minority for lack of an obvious approach to dealing with their anomalous situation. Ill-treatment of a minority tends to rouse the people and government of the minority’s kin state to defend their ethnic fellows. Mexican President Felipe Calderón has strongly defended the rights of Mexicans living illegally in the United States, asserting that they have a right to American citizenship. He has addressed the U.S. Congress on the topic, and Mexico has joined Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Chile in filing amicus briefs arguing the injustice of Arizona’s stringent immigration law. Italy does not feel free to simply deport the thousands of illegal Chinese immigrants who man the sewing machines of Prato, despite the loud protests of Italian unions and factory-owners out-competed by Chinese-owned sweatshops. Instead of enforcing workplace regulations, Italy discusses the issue with the government of China.9 By contrast, Italy does not hesitate to deport undocumented Roma.
Italy is not alone. Germany deported tens of thousands of Roma admitted with refugee status during the Balkan wars. Some of the deportees had been supported by the German state for as long as a decade, but they were never given working papers, and Germany did not want them or their German-born children to become permanent residents. They were sent “home” to be citizens of new nation-states that did not want them any more than Germany did. Wealthy European states regularly deport undocumented Roma to the poorer parts of the European Union where they hold citizenship, a perfectly legal procedure if the deported persons have not found work and if their cases are handled individually. The Sarkozy administration drew international attention to French policy in 2010 less for deporting Roma than for targeting them as members of an ethnic group. An August 2010 directive sent by the Ministry of the Interior to regional police prefects directed them to disband 300 illegal vagrant campsites within three months, “the priority, those of the Roma.”10 EU officials bristled at the ethnic targeting of the Roma and insisted on their right to be deported as individuals. To paraphrase de Clermont-Tonnerre: To the Roma as individuals, deportation; to the Roma as a nation, deportation on a case-by-case basis.
The deportation of an ethnic group is always a human tragedy, but it only becomes a catastrophe when no state is willing to offer citizenship. In many cases, a state that sees refugees as ethnic or ideological kin will step up to offer the refugees a new home. Ten million Hindus driven from Bangladesh in 1971 were accepted by India, as were 300,000 expelled from Burma in 1962. Turkey accepted 300,000 “Turks” forced out of Bulgaria in 1989.11
Many nation-states go further, shaping their emigration laws to ensure that citizenship will be available to ethnic kin who may need it. The British Parliament enacted a series of post-World War II immigration reforms designed to protect the right of return for descendants of Britons who had gone out to build the Empire, while restricting the entry of imperial subjects and former subjects of non-British ancestry. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968, for example, limited the offer of citizenship to individuals with a “substantial connection” to Britain, such as a Britain-born grandparent. Germany’s citizenship laws were similarly shaped by the need to provide citizenship for millions of ethnic Germans expelled from eastern and central Europe at the end of the war, and the need to keep the option of German citizenship open for ethnic Germans in the Communist states. According to Christian Joppke, it was only after the likelihood had receded that Britannia and Germania’s children would become refugees that these governments enacted more ethnically neutral immigration laws.12 There are few such post-colonial populations left today, but it isn’t hard to imagine that, say, if ancestral Japanese or French or Chinese were left standing on the wharves by an ethnic cleansing that left them facing death, as the Greek population of Smyrna was in 1922, they would be given refuge by their respective kin states.
Indeed, speaking of 1922 and the World War that gave rise to the events in Anatolia to which mention has just been made, the fate of the Christian communities there stands as a vivid demonstration of the value of having a kin state, even if it is weak, poor and less than effectively governed. The ethnic cleansings of Anatolia’s ancient Greek and Armenian communities began with the Armenian massacres of the 1890s, but the outcomes for the two groups were very different: The Greeks had a kin state, but the Armenians did not. The Armenians were not welcome as a group anywhere, and they suffered grievously for it. The flood of Greek refugees overwhelmed impoverished Greece, but the refugees were nonetheless saved alive. These were “Greeks” whose ancestors had lived in Anatolia since ancient times and who spoke a range of sometimes mutually unintelligible varieties of Greek. But there was still no question of their right to come “home”, just as the State of Israel has recognized the rights of Jews whose ancestors had lived in India, Ethiopia, Iraq and elsewhere for millennia, to come home to Zion. For peoples as for individuals, home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.
This kind of home is precisely what the Roma lack. Roma activists and intellectuals are aware of the advantages of launching a national movement and achieving sovereignty, but nationalism has gained little traction because of the insuperable problem of territory. In 2000, a small organization called the Congress of International Romani Union attempted to square this circle by demanding that Europe recognize the Roma as a non-territorial nation. This was an interesting revival of an idea that had considerable support in the last decades of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The Hapsburgs had a conspicuously successful empire for a very long time. It was rich, and its glittering capital drew ambitious young people like a magnet. Unfortunately for its last emperor, imperialism had an increasingly difficult time justifying itself in an age of nations. The hyphen that denoted equal status for Hungarians, introduced under duress in 1867, only exacerbated the problem, since the Czech nationalists wanted in on the hyphenation action too. On the other hand, there remained strong support for the imperial system, for everyone understood the difficulty of dividing central Europe’s ethnic patchwork into geographically discrete nation-states. (It is easy to forget that the relative ethnic tidiness of the Hapsburg lands today was the outcome of massive ethnic cleansings during and after both World Wars.) Before the First World War, the benefits of membership in the empire, the tangled patchwork of ethnic enclaves and strong attachment to ethnic identities generated considerable support for proposals to create non-territorial nations within the empire. Political parties running on this platform even won seats in the Reichsrat.
Ultimately, of course, the empire fractured along ethnic lines and finally collapsed altogether as an outcome of World War I. But the idea of creating non-territorial nations within Europe was not absurd under the Hapsburgs, and it is not absurd now. It is, however, an untried and uncertain political scheme, and so it has been outcompeted in the marketplace of ideas by nationhood. Proposals to create a non-territorial Roma nation have thus gone nowhere (although they may have some political utility in advancing other Roma claims).
The mundane tools of national movements have nevertheless made some headway among the Roma. Roma intellectuals in several countries have created written languages based on regional varieties of spoken Romani, although none has yet gained wide acceptance. Creating a standard written language is a nationalist project with a long history and many recent precedents: Macedonian and Indonesian were deliberately crafted from older spoken languages in the 1940s. The disadvantage the Roma face is that there is no national government to orchestrate the production of books, newspapers and documents in the Roma language. Furthermore, literary production in Romani has been negligible, with the exception of song lyrics. When Roma authors publish, they do so in other languages. Moreover, a declining number of Europe’s self-identified Roma speak a Roma language today as their first tongue, and the tiny amount of material published in the new written versions tends to be subsidized by non-Roma non-governmental organizations. In fact, most Roma ethnic activism is funded by such groups, one of which is George Soros’s Open Society Foundation.
The most flourishing aspect of Romani culture is music, which enjoys wide popularity and offers significant economic opportunity. Still, being allowed to play in the orchestra is not the same as being a guest at the concert.
There is one last aspect of Roma identity that may be a game changer: demography. Reliable information on the size of Europe’s Roma population is notoriously difficult to come by because of the complexity of determining who is a Roma, sensitivities about collecting data on ethnicity, and a reluctance on the part of some governments to count Roma for fear that it will lead to political movements to remediate discrimination against them.13 That said, population estimates of European Roma range from seven to 11 million.
More significantly, Roma fertility is high at a time when it has fallen below replacement levels in many European populations. According to demographer László Hablicsek, Roma were about 6 percent of the population of Hungary at the beginning of the century, but by the end of this decade as many as one Hungarian birth in six may be Roma.14 In other parts of central Europe and the Balkans, the percentage of Roma in the population will soon pass 10 percent. And they are citizens with the right to vote.
Although the Roma are a people without a land, at least theoretically they could become people with a land of sorts by the simple act of settling down, having children and displacing the extant majority group. Population replacement does happen in history, but it requires the incoming culture to be so powerful and attractive that large numbers of the indigenous population abandon their inherited culture in favor of the new one. I know of no instances in which an oral culture without an army, like the Roma, replaces a literate culture with an established government. More significantly, the numbers simply do not support alarmist and inflammatory assertions that Roma will soon outnumber Romanians in Romania or Slavs in Macedonia. It is true that Roma have the large families associated with male-dominated cultures, in which men prove their virility, and women their worth, by producing children. But the leap from that fact to the idea that Roma are about to “take over” is far fetched, particularly as Roma birthrates have begun to decline with entry into the modern economy.
Ultimately, it is up to the nations of Europe to decide whether to make a genuine effort to include the Roma in modern society, or to continue policies that have successfully kept the Roma as an underclass of poorly educated and impoverished day-laborers. Here, Roma demography might have an impact well short of concepts of non-territorial minority status. As the Roma approach 10 percent of the voting-age population in several countries, they may no longer have to wait patiently for their governments to treat them fairly, or for a non-governmental organization or the European Union to intervene on their behalf. If they vote as a bloc and position themselves effectively in the coalition politics of the countries in which they are citizens, Roma may have the power to demand routine political concessions like increased funding for housing, jobs, schools, healthcare, and even cultural goods like schoolbooks and Roma language classes. The only option not on the table for the Roma is to become a nation-state. For a people not wistfully, but willfully, without a land, that option is forever closed.
1See Suzanne Daley and Raphael Minder, “In Spain, Gypsies Find Easier Path to Integration”, New York Times, December 5, 2010.
2Perhaps the Roma are simply located in an area where their insistence on statelessness is noticed. See James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed (Yale University Press, 2009) and Henry Farrell’s review, “The State of Statelessness”, The American Interest (January/February 2010).
3Stewart, The Time of the Gypsies (HarperCollins, 1997).
4Jack Greenberg, “Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation and Beyond”, Columbia Law Review (May 2010).
5See James Clark Leith, Why Botswana Prospered (McGill-Queens University Press, 2005).
6Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2010.
7Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture”, Journal of Democracy (January 1995).
8See Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century—The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture”, Scandinavian Political Studies (June 2007).
9Rachel Donadio, “Chinese Remake the ‘Made in Italy’ Fashion Label”, New York Times, September 12, 2010.
10Steven Erlanger, “Document Cites French Bid to Oust Roma”, New York Times, September 12, 2010.
11Turkey later reversed this policy. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass expulsion in modern international law and practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 112.
12Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State (Oxford University Press, 1999).
13Christina McDonald and Katy Negrin, “No Data—No Progress: Data Collection in Countries Participating in the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015”, Open Society Foundations (September 2010).
14Hablicsek, “The Development and the Spatial Characteristics of the Roma Population in Hungary Experimental Population Projections Till 2021”, Demográfia, 8.