The Iraqi political class has finally struck a deal on government formation—but what does the deal mean?
To begin with, it means the Iranian project of entrenching in power incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Shiite religious parties that support him for another five years has succeeded—a project that has been in the works since last summer and probably earlier. While the eight months that elapsed between the March 7 elections and the deal to form the government hint at the limits of Iran’s ability to force decisions on Iraqi political coalitions, and on Iraq in general, Tehran has firmly cemented itself in the center of Iraqi politics. It is now positioned to take full advantage of this development to advance its interests after the end of the American troop presence next year.
The deal is also a great disappointment for the Sunni Arab supporters of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiyya bloc, and, by extension, the neighboring Arab states who supported them and Allawi’s candidacy for Prime Minister. Having voted for Iraqiyya in large numbers and having helped his bloc win the greatest number of seats in parliament (91), the Sunnis believed they would hold substantial power in the next government. Unless Maliki unexpectedly offers substantial government positions to the Sunnis, the disappointing results of the government formation process may lead many of them to stand back from politics once more, or return to active support of insurgency. Iraq’s neighbors may likewise reevaluate their stance on Iraq and reconsider their very tentative moves toward engagement.
For the Kurds, the deal is a triumph. As part of the price for their support, Maliki and his State of Law Coalition agreed to support 18 of 19 Kurdish political demands having to do with development of petrochemical resources, a resolution of the territorial dispute over the city of Kirkuk, related border questions, and other issues. They also re-established their role as kingmakers, having played an active role in brokering the compromises that led to the new government and retaining their hold on the presidency.
The government formation deal, in a broader sense, has also dealt a setback to the nascent non-sectarian politics that began to emerge in the provincial elections of 2009 and again before the national elections in March. Both of these elections witnessed an effort to build cross-sectarian alliances and saw candidates more eager to campaign on basic issues such as effective government and delivery of services rather than narrower sectarian and ethnic interests. The re-emergence of ethnic politics and appeals in the post-election period, however, disappointed many Iraqis and led to disgust with the polarized political process. This apparent failure may lead to future retrenchments against efforts reach across sectarian lines.
And what of the United States? Washington seems to regard the result as a vindication of its policy to publicly push the Iraqis to form a broad-based government as soon as possible, while exerting quiet influence behind the scenes to shape an agreement that would leave Maliki in power. The US evidently hoped to limit his role as Prime Minister, however, by granting the speakership of the parliament to the Iraqiyya bloc and endorsing Allawi to head a new “Council for Strategic Policies,” which, in theory, would have the power to veto or amend national security decisions by the Prime Minister and the government. President Obama called the deal a “milestone” and added that it was “inclusive, representative, and reflect(s) the will of the Iraqi people.”
But this seems to be calling the glass half-full. The Administration appears to have backed off an earlier interest in ushering Allawi to the presidency while elevating the current Shiite deputy vice president Adel-Abdel Mahdi to the premiership. In the process it settled on Maliki as the lesser of two evils—the greater being an indefinite hiatus in launching the next government. By doing so, the administration helped advance Iran’s political objectives in Iraq, even though Washington may primarily see the outcome as essential to Iraq’s stability.
In addition, while an “inclusive” government may be desirable in theory (if it succeeds in engaging all parties in a cooperative working relationship), during the last five years “inclusive” has more often meant a government of rivals working at cross purposes to advance their individual political interests. Stalemate, procrastination and ineffectiveness have been the typical result. It has most assuredly not reflected the will of the Iraqi people.
The end result is likely to pose serious challenges to American policy, even as Washington counts down to the final troop withdrawal at the end of 2011 and looks forward to building a new “strategic partnership” with Iraq.
As Iraq and the international community sort out the winners and losers, the hard part looms ahead. This is the phase that will tell whether Iraq has a government that fairly distributes political power among the major blocs and is open to an expanded relationship with the United States, or one that will lead to dysfunction, disenfranchisement for key political blocs, and deadlock on major issues.
First, the key ministries must be apportioned. Most significant are the so-called “sovereign” ministries—Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, and Oil—that hold the instruments of financial power, diplomacy, and internal security. Allawi’s Iraqiyya has allegedly been promised the Foreign Ministry, currently held by the respected Kurdish diplomat Hoshyar Zebari. But according to the noted Iraq observer Reidar Visser, Iraqiyya may be denied any of the key security posts. These top-line decisions will reflect the true power of the negotiating blocs, say a bit more about the influence of the United States (and Iran), and signal whether the new Iraqi government will be able to work together or remain a series of ethnic fiefdoms.
Almost as important are the subministerial jobs, whose occupants will have substantial influence over the day-to-day administration of the government. Here the Sadrists (the influential bloc that supported Maliki and follows the hardline pro-Iranian cleric Moqtada al-Sadr) may have a serious claim on influence. In the past, the Sadrists have generally used their positions in government to profit politically, economically and personally; a significant Sadrist presence in these or more senior jobs will not bode well for Iraq’s future.
In addition, the role of the Council for Strategic Policies must be created, requiring at a minimum legislation and possibly constitutional revisions to empower the body and grant it checks on the prime minister’s authority. This is very far from a done deal and is likely to be hard-fought in the parliament. Even if appropriate legislation is passed, Maliki’s authoritarian tendencies and the current concentration of power over the security services in his Office of the Commander in Chief could very easily undermine any legal authority the Council might have. The outcome of all this may determine whether Allawi and the majority of his bloc decide to participate in government, join the opposition or boycott the political process altogether, with concomitant blowback for US policy.
Addressing the demands of the Kurds will be another difficult issue. Most of the 18 points Maliki agreed to in order to gain Kurdish backing are not only politically controversial, especially within Allawi’s bloc and among its Sunni Arab supporters, but might require constitutional changes too. Given the ill-will and political divisions the last elections and government formation interregnum engendered, it is hard to see how satisfactory progress can be made on these without intense political battles and possible alienation of the Kurds.
And, if Sunnis are largely dealt out of power in the next government, can Maliki address at least some of their demands to keep them inside the political process? Chief among these is the fate of the Sons of Iraq, the Sunni militia forces who were instrumental in defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI (now resurgent in the aftermath of the election). Will their integration into the Iraqi Security Forces continue? About half of them have been given such jobs; the others (about 45,000) remain in a sort of limbo, sometimes unpaid by the government, with their future employment uncertain. Many could return to violence and collaboration with Al-Qaeda in the absence of a fair deal to co-opt them into government service.
For the Iraqi public at large, there are bigger issues at stake. The failure of the government to improve upon the delivery of basic services was a major issue in 2009 and in March 2010; shortfalls in the delivery of power led to rioting and protests in Basra and other southern cities this summer and the resignation of the electricity minister. Continued violence has undermined confidence in the government and raised the specter of renewed civil war. Security, health services, clean water, and basic infrastructure delivery are the main concerns for most Iraqi citizens, and the inability of the government to deliver them consistently has caused disillusionment with politics and indeed with democracy itself. The United States is now out of the infrastructure building process in Iraq, with only meager results to show for it. Few other have stepped in. The onus now falls on Maliki and the rest of the Iraqi government. How they perform on these key concerns may be the main determinant of Iraq’s future political course.