A fiery debate is taking place in the Iranian establishment over whether its regional policies—backing Shi’a and Shi’a-friendly forces like Hezbollah and the Assad and Maliki governments to the hilt in brutal civil wars—is working. According to The Wall Street Journal, Iranian doves are pointing to the recent regional chaos as an argument that Iran has overextended itself. Hardliners, though, probably including the Ayatollah Khamanei, feel that despite difficulties, Iran is fundamentally winning the regional power struggle and see no need to change what works.
From the Iranian perspective, its strategy so far has certainly yielded fruit: Assad is holding onto power in Syria, with help from Hezbollah, and the Maliki government in Iraq is more sectarian and more aligned with Iran—with U.S. influence in that country greatly diminished.
However, as Iran’s doves note, these gains have come at a cost. There has been a remarkable consolidation of Sunni sentiment against the Shi’a as Iran and its allies make gains. The disparate Sunni terrorist and tribal groups in the Fertile Crescent have united, for now, under the banner of ISIS, which shook the region and the world by routing Iraq’s army and occupying much of the country. Meanwhile, the Saudis and the Gulf States, where there is a great deal of sympathy for ISIS, are engaged in a complicated dance that certainly involves some degree of tacit backing for the anti-Shi’a force. On another front, the Saudis are so alarmed at Iranian advances that they are credibly reported to be cooperating militarily with Israel. Iran’s successes, in short, have focused its regional rivals on it as the paramount enemy.
Iran’s doves have seized on these points to argue that Tehran should scale back support for Assad and push Maliki toward a more inclusive approach in Iraq. We can’t know what is said behind closed doors in Tehran, but they seem to be hammering on three points. First, they see Iran’s regional overreach as contributing to Sunni radicalism, unity, and pushback. For instance, they see the recent entry of Hamas into a unity government with the Palestinian Authority as the loss of a strong, radical, but Sunni regional ally. And it doesn’t stop there. As Saeed Leylaz, an Iranian analyst cited by the Journal, remarked, “Iran’s geopolitical policies have failed. We have lost Hamas, overstretched Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now have al Qaeda spilling from Syria to Iraq.”
Iran benefits most, so the doves appear to reason, when the Sunnis are not being driven into an alliance out of fear of Tehran. Iran should therefore look for policies that don’t scare its religious adversaries — even at the cost of Tehran’s recognizing limits on its regional ambitions.
Secondly, they see the captain of Team Sunni, Saudi Arabia, as a dangerous adversary with close ties to terror groups, American power, and nuclear Pakistan. Some kind of détente, coo the doves, would allow things to cool down and Iran to retrench.
The third point is economic. Iraq already had two civil conflicts on its hands—the big war in Syria and the sputtering conflict in Lebanon. ISIS has now opened another full scale civil war in Iraq. Hezbollah, Assad and Maliki all need a lot of help to stay in the fight, and given Iran’s weak economic foundations, that is a serious issue.
If Iran steps back, say the doves, it can reduce Sunni-Shi’a tension. Without a common Iranian menace to keep them united, the Sunni powers will split, the anti-Shi’a ‘holy war’ will be less intense, and Iran can move more slowly but more surely towards its longtime goals. Throw in a nuclear deal with the U.S., and the sanctions go away; a richer Iran would be able, at its leisure, to revisit the task of handling the Saudis and their allies.
For the hawks, on the other hand, the key argument appears to be something like the following: yes, the current strategy has costs and yes there are difficulties, but Iran is conquering right now. Assad is stronger than he was. Despite ISIS, or indeed to some degree because of it, Iran’s influence in the parts of Iraq that it cares most about is growing. In both nations, Iran has deployed substantial advisors on the ground, and increasingly Iraq as well as Syria is looking like a client government. The Saudis, Iran’s hawks can claim, may have more money than Iran, but they are currently committed to propping up Egypt, propping up rebels in Syria, supporting anti-Shi’a forces in Lebanon, supporting (it is said, and the Iranians presumably believe that the rumors are true) ISIS. They’ve got the Yemen war on one side, and they can’t let Jordan fall. This is a heavy burden, even for them. Iran, say the hawks, can win a war of attrition with the House of Saud.
Elsewhere, while Hezbollah may be having problems, and ISIS is ugly, Iran’s hawks reason that the best way to help their friends and hurt their enemies is to avoid clever stratagems with a lot of moving parts and to concentrate instead on the simple task of helping their friends and hurting their enemies. Propping up Assad both helps Hezbollah and hurt ISIS. By working hard to strengthen the Shia in Iraq, Iran ultimately extends its power and can crush ISIS between Baghdad and Damascus.
Most importantly, the Journal piece points to clues that suggest despite the dangers, Iran’s Supreme Leader is quietly moving to ensure that Iran doubles down on its current course. Recent press releases by the Fars News Agency, affiliated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, have played up the Shiite religious obligation to fight in Iraq and shown video of what appears to be a recruitment drive. Meanwhile, Khamenei’s recent personnel changes in the highest levels of power seem to indicate a strengthening of the hard line. In a country where the Supreme Leader has the final say in all the most important questions, these signs make it likely that the hawks have the upper hand.
There are several interesting, not to say alarming, considerations emerging for the United States as this process unfolds in Tehran. Most significantly, potential American reactions don’t seem play a large role in Iran’s strategic calculations—Iranians don’t seem to think that the success or failures of their regional policies have much to do with what the U.S. will or will not do. They are writing Washington off.
Hawks and doves alike, none of the Iranians interviewed in the Journal’s saw fit to mention America in their calculations. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and even the Palestinian Authority enter into their calculations – does DC fall dead last? This is perhaps a snapshot rather than a survey, but it seems in line with the regional views of Washington’s recent impotence.
That is not the way we want the mullahs and their friends to be thinking. The more Iran thinks the success or failure of its regional policies and moreover its security from regional enemies at home depends on U.S. actions, the more likely Iran becomes to accept a true “grand bargain” with the U.S. in which Iran accepts both a nuclear compromise and a regional geopolitical compromise.
President Obama is right to want a bargain with Iran, and right, too, that we can’t get such a bargain without offering Iran some incentives. The U.S. has a lot to gain from a new relationship with Tehran: the end of Iran’s nuclear program, a framework for political stability in the Middle East, and a U.S.-Iran detente. And the administration also understands that it will be easier to get that kind of bargain if the doves start winning more policy arguments in Tehran.
Unfortunately, American policy hasn’t been helping. The White House seems to have hoped that a quiet stance on the regional issues would give the doves new power in Tehran by removing the perception of American enmity and threat. The assumption here is that Iran is in a defensive crouch and that it is truculent because it is fearful. Therefore, if American becomes more soothing, Iran will be mollified, the hardliners will lose power, and doves will be able to strike a bargain with the U.S. in a deal that would be an immense boost to a President whose foreign policy hasn’t looked very good lately.
But the soothing strategy has a downside: instead of empowering the doves it can empower the hawks. If Iran isn’t worried about American reaction (military strikes in the event nuclear talks break down, heavy support for the Sunnis in the regional war, tighter sanctions), then hawks have a strong argument for risk taking and a dynamic forward strategy. If the U.S. is trying to disengage, the hawks can argue, then Iran faces only relatively weak regional rivals, and this is an excellent time to march ahead.
The shock of the ISIS sweep across Iraq has clearly been felt at the White House; requesting $500 million for non-ISIS rebels in Syria and sending U.S. advisors back to Baghdad are clear signs of that. Let’s hope these two steps indicate that the White House understands that being “nice” to Iran is actually not the way to empower Tehran’s doves. Rather, signs that Washington is as alarmed as the Sunnis by Iran’s surge and that, like the Sunnis, it is looking for ways to change the balance of forces in the region would give the doves some strong new arguments — and give pause to some of the more rational hawks.
Taking a tough stance across the region against Iran’s ambitions probably looks to some of the President’s key advisors as a dangerous move that would heighten tensions in the Muslim world, risk greater U.S. military involvement at a time when that is almost suicidally unpopular in the U.S., and reduce the chances of a nuclear deal and détente, which remain the holy grail of Obama’s Middle East policy. Given how often their Middle East calculations haven’t worked, these advisors should at least be open to the possibility that exactly the opposite is true: that pivoting away from deep engagement in the region doesn’t conciliate Iran but encourages Iran’s hawks, chief among whom, it would appear, is the Supreme Leader.
Americans characteristically think of their opponents more like American lawyers than like seasoned players in the real world game of thrones. We think that displays of good faith and peaceful intent will encourage others to reciprocate in kind. Those instincts aren’t always wrong, and with some countries and in some situations they work very well. But the Middle East often works on a different kind of logic; strength united with willpower in the service of achievable goals gets more points than professions of friendship and elaborate displays of pacific intent.
When it comes to Iran, President Obama has and has long had the right goal. But as he and his close advisors stare at the wreckage of Iraq and of dire alternatives they now face, it’s time to take another look at the strategy for getting Iran to say ‘yes’. A little more tough and a little less love might get us closer to the kind of understanding that could help this tormented region cool down.