A new turn in the Minsk negotiating process has accompanied the sharp drop in fighting in Ukraine’s east over the past six weeks. Both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, the changes have come from a growing realization in the Kremlin that its policy of aggression Ukraine is failing.
Since it launched its undeclared, hybrid war in the Donbass in April of 2014, Kremlin policy has been to destabilize the reform government in Kyiv by engaging in low-intensity conflict that would not provoke opposition or counter-measures from the U.S. and Europe. Things didn’t go exactly according to plan, however. The success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the summer of 2014 prompted Moscow to escalate its intervention in order to bail out its proxies, which in turn led to major U.S. and EU sanctions that summer. Russia has been reeling since.
Hammered by the combination of Western sanctions and plummeting oil prices, the Kremlin agreed to the two sets of ceasefires negotiated in Minsk, the first in September of 2014 and the second in February of 2015. For Moscow, the purpose of the ceasefires was not to end the fighting. Rather, it was to provide a cover for the EU to lift sanctions while Moscow continued a low intensity war that, in the past 13 months, resulted in the conquest of over 700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and the death of several hundred Ukrainian soldiers.
The only problem for Moscow is that the EU has not played along to their script. Under strong German leadership, the EU made the decision to renew the 2014 sanctions in March of 2015 and then officially did so in June. Meanwhile, with the further cratering of oil and gas prices globally, the Russian economy has gone into a sharp recession. The IMF predicts negative growth of 3 percent this year, and other economists see greater losses. Russian officials claim that the sanctions account for 1-1.25 percent of GNP decline. As Sergei Ivanov, Mr. Putin’s Chief of Staff, told the Valdai group this past week in Sochi, Russia needs to get the sanctions lifted.
While the Russian economy has been weakening, the Ukrainian military position in the East has gotten stronger. From Mariupol on the Sea of Azov in the south, pushing north to Donetsk and then Luhansk, the Ukrainians have dug in fortified defensive positions. Indeed, they have created three defensive lines. If the Russian punch through one, they will not get very far before finding the next one.
What is more, the Obama Administration took the decision in late September to send counter-battery radar for missiles to Ukraine. Long-range Russian artillery has been responsible for over 80 percent of Ukraine’s casualties. The radar, plus the heavily fortified lines, mean that it would be much harder for the Kremlin to gain additional Ukrainian territory at the current level of violence. To break through those defenses, Moscow would have to use air power or at least ten to twenty thousand regular troops supported by heavy armor. Such a sharp escalation would lead to additional sanctions and, most likely, substantial Western military aid to Ukraine.
This explains the Kremlin decision to deescalate on the battlefield and to start cooperating on the diplomatic side. The current state along the line of contact in Ukraine’s east is almost a ceasefire. (There are 30-40 fire incidents every day, but only a few Ukrainian fatalities since September 1.)
At the October 2 Paris meeting with Presidents Hollande, Poroshenko, and Hollande and Chancellor Merkel, Vladimir Putin was by all accounts helpful. He agreed, for instance, that the local elections in the separatist Ukrainian enclaves—the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR)—would be postponed until January. This stands in sharp contrast to the February 12 meeting of the four leaders in Minsk, when Putin was nothing short of truculent. (Perhaps that had something to do with the fact that, in violation of the Minsk I ceasefire, a combination of Russian special forces and local proxies had a good portion of Ukraine’s army nearly encircled at Debaltseve.)
Putin also showed flexibility on other issues in Paris. For instance, he agreed to a withdrawal of both light and heavy weapons at least 15 KM from the line of contact, and permitted OSCE monitors much more freedom to move around the DNR and LNR to ensure compliance. That said, parts of the DNR have remained inaccessible to the monitors since Paris. But the change of tone was noteworthy.
Over the past couple of years, Putin has been relying on an aggressive foreign policy to maintain his popularity in Russia. After all, economic growth was beginning to stagnate even before the price for hydrocarbons started to crater in 2014. So it is no coincidence that the Kremlin has deescalated in Ukraine at the same time as it intervened in Syria. It would be an oversimplification to say that the decision on Syria was taken to divert attention from the retreat in Ukraine. Putin has long stated his support for the beleaguered President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, and over the summer the Syrian dictator’s position had weakened considerably. But balance of power considerations don’t make for good propaganda. For domestic consumption, Russian media has highlighted the fact that Moscow has opened a “second front” against the West.
With this latest turn of events, the pressure is momentarily off Kyiv to pass the constitutional legislation on decentralization mandated by Minsk II that would provide special status to the LNR and the DNR. Instead, the French and Germans are now pressing for Ukraine to pass a local elections bill for the occupied areas so that elections there can take place early next year. The problem for Ukraine is that as agreed at the Paris meeting, not all armed fighters need be out of these territories when the elections take place.
The Ukrainians fear, naturally enough, that these armed men will “persuade” voters to vote for the Kremlin’s stooges. Yet the Germans and French note that, according to the Minsk process, the local elections must be “in accordance with Ukrainian law,” and “with the highest international standards” and with a major presence and role for the OSCE. They understand that it would be reasonable for Ukraine to write the legislation, including language and procedures designed to increase the likelihood of free and fair elections, in the face of these armed men. Based on my recent meetings with several dozen MPs from several parties in Kyiv, it seems likely that this election bill can get through parliament.
If the Ukrainians manage this, the onus will shift to Moscow. The Kremlin’s current “light touch” in Ukraine will make it hard for them to agree to electoral safeguards ensuring free and fair elections—because their proxies have little chance of winning such a vote.
Yet even during this period of accommodation, the Kremlin is conceding nothing. At Valdai last week, senior Russian officials claimed that the constitutional bill on decentralization that passed its first reading in the Ukrainian parliament—to become law, constitutional legislation must pass twice, the second time by a two thirds majority—did not meet the Minsk requirement for “federalization.” This reserves Moscow’s right to walk away from the Minsk agreement in the future. Moscow wants a bill that gives its Ukrainian enclaves a veto over Kyiv’s national security policy. Kyiv will never accept this and Berlin and Paris will not side with Moscow on this question.
Come January it is highly likely that the EU will renew the sanctions on Moscow. As explained by numerous German, French and other EU diplomats, Moscow must implement all its Minsk obligations before the sanctions can be eased. They understand that continuing sanctions is essential now that it was agreed in Paris to extend Minsk into next year.
Once this bitter fact is absorbed in Moscow, we will see if the temporary lull in Kremlin aggression holds. The Kremlin has all its options open. It could maintain the lull, resume the low intensity war, or escalate sharply. What Russia does may depend partly on the progress of its Syrian operation. For Putin, foreign adventures are designed in part to bolster his political standing. If his intervention in Syria is going well in January, he would have less political need to pursue a war policy in Ukraine.
