In the current debate about Nordic security, it is sometimes claimed that if Sweden and Finland joined the NATO alliance, it would increase regional tensions and serve as a provocation to Russia. A steady flow of articles and official statements from Russia assures us that Moscow has only been reactive in recent years, and acted merely to correct some of the injustices it suffered when the West took advantage of its weakness in the 1990s. We should therefore accept that the West carries part of the blame for the current situation and its dynamic of action-reaction. Above all, we should not aggravate the situation further by taking steps that Russia finds menacing. It is quite striking what a powerful role this call to “understand the Russian point of view’’ plays among the arguments of the opponents of Swedish NATO membership. It is not only voiced by Russian sources but also echoed by veteran participants in the Swedish security debate. That is why we would like to set the record straight.
In truth, this is how things stand. The current crisis in Russian-Western relations has its roots in internal developments in Russia. Russia’s tragic failure to democratize and implement the economic reform agenda of the 1990s had many causes, but none of them can be blamed on the West. Simply put, the basic reason for its failure was that its desire for reform was not sufficient; there was never any radical break with the past within the powerful Soviet state and its security apparatus. The roots of the authoritarian, nationalistic, and corrupt Soviet system run so much deeper than we could understand in the 1990s.
President Vladimir Putin, the incarnation of the ambitions of these vested, deep-state interests to regain political control, has dominated Russia during the past 15 years, recentralizing control of the country’s economy for his and their purposes. The “colored revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia, the consequences of the so-called Arab Spring and, not least, the widespread protests in major Russian cities in 2011–12 all contributed to the sharp turn of Putin’s third term as President. We have witnessed the acceleration of two distinct processes: authoritarian mobilization internally and confrontation with the West externally. These two processes complement and reinforce each other, and serve the over-all purpose of preserving control over gigantic economic resources for the current Russian leadership. Intensified rearmament, and the strangulation of both independent media and political activity are part of these policies, combined with skillful state propaganda conveying the message that Russia has been provoked and insulted and therefore has legitimate grounds for seeking a readjustment of the existing international order. According to this version, Russia did not lose the Cold War, but should be given credit for having done away with Communist rule. The blame must be placed on the West, which has treated Russia as a loser and exploited the country’s weakness, more or less like the Versailles peace treaty handled the defeated Germany. Such is the refrain, with ominous hints at possible fatal consequences, if due account is not taken of Russia’s legitimate interests.
Like most people who have spent many years studying Russian affairs, we do not in the least share this view of the situation. Russia’s principal problem today is the fact that the country has not broken away from its Soviet past in any decisive way, and that the national leadership lacks both the capacity and the desire to adapt to the conditions of democracy and the market economy. The Kremlin rejects globalization and instead takes refuge in a 19th-century system of ideas and attitudes, including cultural conservatism, the restoration of spheres of interest, and the creation a zone around its borders made up of countries that feel unsafe, vulnerable, and dependent upon Moscow. In these efforts, information, money, and the penetration of open societies play as significant a role as military threats.
This image of a Russia encircled by hostile forces, including an aggressive and growing NATO and European Union, was created to legitimize the regime’s actions. The specter of an outside threat keeps domestic support high for a leadership that oppresses and eliminates political opposition and free media, renationalizes major Russian businesses and, by means of rampant corruption, reserves the profits of Russia’s raw material exports for a small and loyal elite. Russia is one of the most unequal societies in the world.
In the absence of high oil prices, the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought it. Now that loyalty must be secured in some other way. The country’s revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to internal political conditions and to the Kremlin’s policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old traditions, although these traditions partially explain why the regime’s propaganda has such resonance for the people.
That Russia’s aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the country’s dysfunctional internal system is a more or less banal conclusion, but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. As a small neighboring country, we cannot afford wishful thinking, or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks.
However, several prominent opponents to a Swedish NATO membership have surprisingly little to say on this point. For them the vital thing remains that Sweden’s security policies do not challenge or annoy Russia as it is. But under present conditions it is difficult to identify any possibilities for a dialogue with Putin’s Russia on a revision of the security order in Europe. This order does not need readjustment; it needs to be respected.
Most probably, however, appeasement or adaptation would not reduce tension either. Conflict with the West simply serves a vital function for the current Russian leadership. Unfortunately, the EU, Sweden, and NATO as well may have to rebuild their capacity to handle a drawn-out confrontation. In the ongoing test of strength, that capacity will generate respect and have a restraining effect on Russia, whereas attempts to see the conflict from the point of view of the opposite side and to search for compromises will be interpreted as signs of weakness and only arouse a greater appetite for confrontation.
The same is true in the military sphere: only demonstrated military capability and increased defense spending and exercises, conducted jointly with NATO and NATO member countries, can have a restraining effect on Russian military pressure.
A NATO membership for Sweden would of course not relieve us of the need to invest more in defense. It would hardly increase the risk of attack, since in practice our country is already considered to be on NATO’s side in the case of a potential conflict. But a Swedish NATO membership would most probably trigger severe Russian criticism, as well as new threats and counter-reactions (and would therefore be a discomfort for Swedish politicians). Indeed, Swedish membership in NATO would mean a considerable political defeat for Russia’s strategy of dividing its neighbors (in order to keep them “independent”). Swedish membership would also substantially facilitate the aid promised by the alliance to the Baltic countries and Poland, thereby enhancing the credibility of NATO. And conversely, a Swedish “no” to the Host Nation Support agreement already approved by the government—something that has become a key demand by leading critics of a Swedish NATO membership—would be a serious setback for regional solidarity, and a major success for the Russian policy.
The principal Russian foreign policy objectives in Europe are to undermine NATO’s as well as the EU’s credibility, to divide and weaken member countries, and most importantly to create a breach between European and transatlantic members. A Swedish membership in NATO would render the commitments of the alliance in the Baltic region more credible, and therefore not only strengthen the security and stability of our immediate region, but also deal a significant setback to Russia’s global aspirations. It would therefore promote most of the objectives, including equal rights and equal dignity of all individuals, democracy, peace and stability, and respect for international law, which usually adorn Swedish foreign policy declarations, irrespective of their party color.