Diplomacy, it seems, is in the air. After the militant unilateralism of the first Bush 43 term, “engagement” has become the meme of the moment. One sees the trend all around: from the suggestions of the Iraq Study Group to the recent pronouncements of presidential candidates (especially the Democratic ones), who have vowed to travel far and frequently to meet foreign leaders (especially the most antagonistic ones) and to base policy on negotiations, dialogue and accommodation. Even the second-term Bush Administration itself has adopted a more conciliatory tone, which rang out immediately after the second Inaugural Address with a new Secretary of State’s fence-mending visit to Europe. Before long Washington was pursuing the diplomatic route to address several pressing issues, previously deemed unsuited to negotiation—North Korea, Iran, the Israel-Palestine cauldron and others besides. In short, diplomacy, thought of specifically as the pursuit of foreign policy goals through negotiations rather than force, has made a comeback.

Or has it? Aside from the fact that none of the aforementioned issues has actually been resolved by diplomacy, its usefulness rather depends on what one means by the term. Those who think of diplomacy as an alternative to the exercise of power rather than as a complement to it will be disappointed in the future. To be sure, diplomacy bereft of calculations of power and suasion can work among close democratic allies who hold basic principles in common. And yes, the sort of diplomacy necessary to end wars will always have a place as long as wars cause disturbances that need tidying up. But the idea that diplomacy can and should displace considerations of power among states with conflicting interests and values is an illusion bound to cause grief.

One gets the impression that just as the principals of the Bush Administration set out to be the un-Clinton and overreached in the process, so now the pendulum is swinging too far back in the opposite direction. Many of Bush’s critics not only reject his policies; they also presuppose in that rejection a reversal of its basic modus operandi. In short, these critics have concluded that overreliance on military assets is best remedied by foreswearing such reliance altogether. Yet a sober and realistic evaluation of the strategic landscape facing the United States shows that whoever occupies the White House in January 2009 will have to deal with a world in which diplomacy is not as availing for settling genuine conflicts of interest as it used to be. Starting with a necessary primer on a much confused concept, let us see why.