Paris. Istanbul. Brussels. These are the most recent and spectacular of the Islamic State’s (IS) outrages. The wave of terrorism is not about to end anytime soon unfortunately. Western countries feel especially vulnerable because theirs are open societies; it is not just transportation nodes, but schools and religious institutions, cafes and restaurants, that are targets. More importantly, the wave of terrorism constitutes the greatest challenge to Europe and the United States since the Cold War. This is because, together with the wave of refugees cascading from the Middle East to European shores, there is a real possibility that many of these European societies will find their character dramatically altered. The rise of right-wing and other extremist groups will fundamentally change the Transatlantic relationship, which has been the foundation of Western success.
If the United States and the West want to prevent the likes of Marine le Pen in France from coming to power, they need to deal IS a deadly blow. The current war against IS has been partly successful; its finances are hurting, recruitment is down, and it has lost significant territory. However, it still controls Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, with an estimated population of a million or more. And in its capital, Raqqa in Syria, its leader, the so-called Caliph al-Baghdadi, resides along with senior cadres.
The real question, then, concerns which of these places to target. Although Mosul is a much larger target and rescuing civilians from IS’s occupation is a critical goal, in such a large city street by street fighting, with booby-trapped buildings, promises to be costly and time consuming. Raqqa, by contrast, is smaller, almost encircled, and far more doable. Additionally, Raqqa is the nerve center for the far-flung network of bombers and others intent on killing civilians. Raqqa’s liberation would deal a heavier military and psychological blow to the “heroic” narrative IS has peddled up to now. With Raqqa gone and the leadership cadres on the run (they won’t be able to fall back on Mosul, because most of the roads have already been cut), morale among IS fighters in Mosul will dissipate quickly.
Nevertheless debate is still raging among allies and especially within the Obama administration as to which of these two cities, Raqqa or Mosul, should be targeted first. Mosul is where the Iraqi army collapsed in June 2014, quickly abandoning its positions and tons of equipment in the face of a rag-tag army of jihadists. Many Iraqi army units were the product of the corrupt fiction of some commanders who pocketed the salaries of imaginary soldiers. It remains to be seen whether the Iraqi army, which has to take the lead, has been rebuilt sufficiently to take on such a mission. Further complicating this question is a coordination nightmare: Iraqi Kurdish forces, the peshmerga, would also take part in the operations, and irregular Shi‘a forces from down south are pushing for a role as well. In other words, the Mosul front is far from being ready.
Raqqa poses another set of challenges: the only force poised to go on the onslaught are the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF, which are primarily composed of the militia of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, the PYD. The PYD, which accounts for almost 80 percent of the SDF’s fighting force, is anathema to America’s NATO ally Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is battling a renewed insurrection by Turkish Kurds led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK with which the PYD has a long-standing affiliation, so he has been dead set against any further U.S.-PYD collaboration, beginning with a slated offensive against the town of Manbij which is Raqqa’s last line of defense. Erdogan’s primary fear is that the Syrian Kurds will achieve a federal arrangement in a post-Bashar al-Assad Syria, not unlike the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, thereby inspiring their Turkish brethren as well.
The offensive against Raqqa would roughly emulate a previous operation against another IS stronghold, Shadadi. Each successful campaign encourages more Sunni Arabs to come and join the anti-IS effort. The projected attack on Manbij is likely to achieve the same result, in which the opposition created a joint military council composed of Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen groups to manage not just the offensive but the days after as well. The challenge in Raqqa will be twofold. First, find sufficient numbers of Arabs, Sunni or Christian, from both outside and inside Raqqa to govern the city, with the PYD playing a much diminished and subordinate role. Second, prevent a race for Raqqa between Damascus-backed forces and the SDF.
Turkish opposition is not the only reason for American reluctance. Raqqa is an Arab city and the Kurds, while willing to lead the coalition in capturing it, echoing American concerns, are unwilling to occupy the area for fear of triggering inter-communal tensions. A great deal of effort is being expended now to increase the Arab contingent of the SDF.
The Obama Administration faced a similar dilemma in October 2014 when IS decided to mount a massive attack on the Syrian Kurdish border town of Kobani. President Obama was faced with a tough choice: abandon the Kurds or deal IS, which was making use of enormous quantities of American-made equipment captured from the Iraqi Army in Mosul, a devastating blow and face the opprobrium of Erdogan, who did not want to see the Kurds survive. Obama overruled advisers worried about Turkey’s reaction and helped save Kobani.
History proved him right; he not only helped create in the PYD the only military force in the region capable of consistently defeating IS, but his cooperation with the Kurds also alarmed the Turks sufficiently to provide the United States access to a series of military bases—something they had steadfastly opposed—to fight IS.
This time, too, cooperation with Syrian Kurds will infuriate Erdogan, but the stakes in Europe are far too dire. Another series of bomb attacks could trigger massive political shifts. The sooner Raqqa is liberated from IS, the sooner IS will be defeated, and, in turn, the sooner the United States and the coalition will be able to focus on the real issue in Syria: its regime’s future. Defeating IS may give the West a respite from terrorism, but it is the reconstitution of Syria that will start resolving the refugee crisis.