The crisis in Ukraine is taking on an alarming—one could even say hopeless—dimension. The Ukrainian state has so far failed to control the situation in its Eastern regions, and the West has failed to stop the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine. The armed and well-organized pro-Russian separatists are continuing to plunge eastern Ukrainian towns deeper and deeper into chaos. Their goal is plain: call for local referenda and declare the independence of the Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkov “People’s Republics”, which will then ask Moscow to accept them into its warm embrace. On May 2, the Ukrainian interim government finally began an offensive on the stronghold of the pro-Russian militants in Slovyansk, and government forces have already overtaken checkpoints around the city, but it remains to be seen whether they will succeed in re-asserting control. And the Moscow-backed separatists can still strike back.
The recent round of U.S. and EU sanctions imposed on Russia have not only failed to prevent further escalation of violence and aggression; they have actually convinced the Kremlin to continue its Ukrainian Crusade. (This should come as no surprise: President Obama himself expressed his skepticism that the sanctions would work.) Putin now has further proof, if more were needed, that the West is disunited, that Germany is dragging its feet, and that the West is unwilling to make sacrifices and is fearful of the consequences of a Russian collapse in the face of truly crippling sanctions. While sanctions are already biting somewhat and have begun to deepen Russia’s recession; they will only force the Kremlin to rethink its position in the long term. In the short term, they will only strengthen Putin’s conviction that the price of backtracking would be higher than the toll exacted by them. “But this is irrational! Putin is mad!” So goes the lament of all too many emotionally excitable observers. No: Putin is more rational than most; his reason, however, is being directed toward ensuring his political survival in Russia.
The joint press conference by President Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on May 2 has proved that Merkel’s “gradualist” diplomatic approach has won the day. Both leaders expressed their readiness “to impose costs on Russia for its actions”, declaring that they will turn the sanctions screw further only if Russia “continues on its current course.” What this ambiguous language means is that the leaders of the world’s most powerful states have not decided yet where the “red line” for Kremlin mischief is drawn. This was no doubt an encouraging press conference for the Kremlin.
In any case, the Russian President is ready to pursue his goal: fragmenting Ukraine, chopping off the East, and turning Ukraine into a zone of instability. One can be sure that the next several weeks will bring an escalation of violence in the Ukrainian east and south too. The pro-Russian separatists and their Russian manipulators have to hurry if they are to stage the “independence referenda” before May 25, when the presidential elections are scheduled.
The May 2 attempts by the pro-Russian militants to destabilize Odessa, Ukraine’s Black Sea port, ended in a bloody confrontation with pro-Ukrainian forces. What this violence in Odessa tells us is that, on the one hand, the police and the interior troops are not able to defend the state, and on the other, that the ordinary citizens in the south are willing to take to the streets in support of an independent Ukrainian state and in opposition to Kremlin influence. The Odessa tragedy, then, could signal a breakthrough in efforts to stem the fragmentation of the Ukrainian state. It’s still far too early to be certain about this, but the signs of a trend have emerged.
On May 3, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov said that Moscow is uncertain how to respond to “the growing confrontation” in Ukraine. People “are calling us and ask for help,” he says. This means that Moscow is still deciding how it will act—not whether it will act. The only real question is which means and instruments to be used to apply pressure.
The Kremlin surely understands, however, that Ukraine’s south and east are not Crimea. According to polls recently organized by the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli and the Kiev’s International Institute of Sociology only 15.4 percent of residents in this region would like to join Russia, with 69.7 percent of respondents thinking that it “would be a bad idea.” Only 11.7 per cent of people in the region support the Russian troops’ incursion. In Donetsk region, where the separatists have installed their rule, the Russian incursion is supported by only 19.3 percent; the rest of population would prefer to live in an independent Ukrainian state. To be sure, a significant part of this population would not resist an occupation: 46.9 percent say that they would stay at home and would not interfere if Russian troops staged an occupation, and in Donbass, 55.4 per cent would stay at home.
However, there are also a lot of people who are ready to defend the Ukrainian state. Consider these numbers: in Kherson 36.9 per cent of people would take part in a resistance movement; in Nikolaev, 31 percent; in Dnipropetrovsk, 26 percent; in Odessa, 24.9 percent. In the Donetsk area, which is viewed as the pro-Russian separatists’ stronghold, 11.9 percent would fight Russian occupation troops; in Lugansk, 10.7 percent say they would. I agree: these numbers are not large. But the number of undecided (20.5 percent) is still high.
But what to people in the south and east think about the Federalization idea—the pro-Russian separatists’ key talking point? About 45 percent support a unitary state with decentralized power, and only 24.8 percent are in favor of Federalization.
What do these polls tell us? When it comes to the efforts to fragment Ukraine and force the annexation or creation of quasi-independent republics (the Transnistria scenario), we should expect to see growing resistance within Ukraine—perhaps even civil war.
Indeed, the building blocks of civil war are already in place. Ukrainians will fight, and this will be a bloody fight; there are too many Ukrainians, even in the south-east, who have grown accustomed to Ukrainian independence and would resist being forcibly returned to the Soviet ghetto.
