It’s been a quiet two days here in Jerusalem — at least for the Mead team. For the last two days I’ve had to cancel all meetings and visits due to a vicious stomach bug that has kept me close, very close, to my hotel room. For most of that time I’ve been too miserable to do much more than watch the seemingly non-stop television coverage of the negotiations over the new coalition government in the UK. Fortunately Nick Mead has been a faithful and loyal nephew, bringing me pills from the outside world and placing bottles of water by my bed from time to time.
From time to time I’ve been able to rouse myself out of dumb animal misery long enough to reflect on what I’ve learned here. In particular I’ve come to feel much more deeply just how difficult the Palestinian situation is. I’m not just talking about checkpoints and limits on travel and development, though these are real. I’m thinking of the situation of the Palestinian Authority and its negotiators.
They are not just caught between the demands of hard line Palestinians and the logic and emotions of the Palestinian national movement on the one hand and the very limited concessions they can hope to extract from the Israelis on the other. Increasingly, they are caught up in a new round of great power rivalry.
Virtually all of the Palestinian leaders I’ve heard from in the last week have alluded to Iran’s new role as a Middle East spoiler. Iran’s grand strategy seems to involve establishing itself as the most radical and uncompromising force in the Middle East against Israel, and using the credibility and popularity that comes from this stance to further its bid to be recognized as the leader of Islam against the West and all its works. By backing Hezbollah and supplying it with, apparently, tens of thousands of new rockets in defiance of the UN resolution ending the last war in Lebanon, Iran is able to maintain pressure on Israel’s northern border. More dangerously, from point of view of the Palestinian Authority, Iran has emerged both as a bank roller and arms supplier to Hamas — and, because of its links to Syria where Hamas’ international leadership is based, it is able to exert serious influence if not control over Hamas’ political line.
For Iran, this is a stunning triumph and a valuable connection. Hamas is part of the Muslim Brotherhood, the most prestigious and respected form of Sunni Islamist organization and protest. Close relations between Iran and Hamas give Iran new legitimacy in the Sunni world and tell Iranians that their strategy is working.
For Palestinians, one of their greatest weaknesses has always been the degree to which outside powers have been able to manipulate Palestinian politics and play one faction off against another. Arafat’s greatest accomplishment in some ways was to impose more unity on the Palestinian movement than either his predecessors or his successors.
Today, the very reasonable and moderate leaders of the Palestinian Authority are once again exposed to the factionalism and destructive meddling of outside forces. With Hamas ruling Gaza, and a strong opposition to Fatah in the West Bank, it is hard and perhaps impossible for the Palestinian Authority to exercise the core function of a state: to control the use of violence within its frontiers.
To put this another way, it is far from clear that the Palestinian Authority can deliver what Israel wants most out of peace: security. And if Israel can’t be reasonably sure that a peace treaty will bring security, it isn’t going to make big concessions for a peace it may not regard as very valuable.
Since Iran and Syria (which had a long history of backing violent Palestinian rejectionists even before it established its current close relationship with Iran) are bitterly opposed to anything that would reduce tensions, they are going to do pretty much whatever they can to strengthen Hamas in its rejectionist course. Any Palestinian movement, journalist or other influential actor willing to fight the treaty can count on support from the patrons of resistance.
The Palestinians I heard from this week did not have very convincing answers to questions about how they would manage this challenge. They spoke of holding a referendum in the West Bank and Gaza and among the Palestinians scattered in other countries (chiefly Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). They felt that there would be such moral pressure that Hamas and its allies could not resist demands for a referendum, and that the overwhelming support that such a referendum would show for peace would force the other groups to accept the results.
It is hard for me to believe that Syria and Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon would go along with this plan, or that Hamas would be so easily intimidated. The chances that this process would bring about a comprehensive settlement between Palestinians and Israelis seem remote. I don’t think negotiations with Abbas and Erekat can produce that kind of peace.
It seems far more likely that what is really on offer is something smaller: peace with a demilitarized West Bank. A Palestinian government confined to the West Bank could improve the situation of both Israelis and Palestinians. Over time, it is possible that Hamas could be induced to extend the peace to Gaza; in the meantime, the significant progress in building security forces for the Palestinian Authority could consolidate the power of a new (though not necessarily very democratic or transparent) order on the West Bank.
This could be a good deal for Israelis. No matter how things evolve in the Middle East, it seems that the conflict with the Palestinians won’t be ended with one big agreement. It will look more like the conflict with the IRA; every time one IRA group accepted peace, a new and more hard line (but smaller and less dangerous) faction seceded to carry on the struggle. Getting the West Bank and Fatah out of the war-making business would be an important step forward if the goal is to drive resistance toward the Palestinian margin.
My sense is that the Israelis, including the present government, see this opportunity. The question, as always, is whether they are willing to meet the essential needs of the Palestinian negotiators trying to hammer out the deal on their side. The trouble is that on some of the contentious issues (Jerusalem and settlements in particular) the Israelis would have to pay the same price to get a deal with the West Bank that they would have to pay to get a comprehensive settlement with the entire Palestinian people. Are they willing (or able) to uproot 100,000 plus settlers and divide Jerusalem for the sake of a peace that leaves many core Israeli concerns unmet?
I’m not the first person to leave Jerusalem with more questions than answers. That may not be a bad thing. There’s the story of an impatient student who went to his rabbi in frustration saying, “Rabbi, why is it that whenever I ask you a question, you never give me an answer — you just ask another question?”
“And what’s wrong with a question?” the rabbi replied.